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Abstract 
 
The historical record of great power transitions is plagued with episodes of 
violence. Hence, the ‘rise of China’ and America’s relative decline sparks a heated 
debate on whether history, in the longer or shorter term, will repeat itself. The 
possible outcomes of this cyclical event, ranging from hegemonic war to a smooth 
transition, vary with the theoretical approach adopted: power transition theory 
postulates that the rising challenger becomes more conflict-prone as it approaches 
the crossover point with the declining hegemon in terms of power, while liberal-
institutionalist theory draws attention to the exceptional character of the current 
Western-led order as the main cause for optimism. In this comparative analysis, 
each theory’s conflicting concepts of power, and the contrasting expectations each 
hold for transitions, are compared. Their focus on different indicators in measuring 
power yields different answers about the size of the US-China power gap and the 
speed at which it is being closed; at the same time, opposing assumptions on state 
satisfaction influence the hypothesis of China being successfully accommodated by 
the international system. An empirical analysis focused on the rising challenger’s 
behaviour over the past two decades reveals alternating periods of revisionism 
and status quo orientation, but in the recent past liberal-institutionalist theory is 
more apt for understanding China’s posture vis-à-vis the US, even after discounting 
for uncertainty and calculative behaviour. On the US’ suppositional impulse to seek 
confrontation in a desperate attempt to retain its leading position in the system, 
evidence on its approach to China also dismisses the alternative proposition of 
preventive action suggested by power transition theorists. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Research question 
In this thesis, I will compare and contrast two theories – power transition 
theory and liberal-institutionalist theory – and their prognoses for Sino-American 
relations in face of China’s growing power and the US’ relative decline. 
The post-Cold War period of which the US emerged as an uncontested leader 
has since witnessed transformations. Russia’s collapse, and the troubled years that 
followed, are now bygone days, as this giant slowly but firmly recovers its form; 
the European Union’s enlargement and deeper integration made it a stronger bloc; 
and a number of fast-growing economies have earned the world’s recognition. 
From the group of ‘traditional’ and emerging powers, China, belonging to the  
latter, is the only one which can aspire to compete with the US at the highest level 
of the international system’s pyramid. 
The notion of the ‘rise of China’ was first used by Kristof (1993) in somewhat 
alarming terms, a year after Munro (1992) had introduced the well-known ‘China 
threat’ theory. Their concerns were not unfounded: power transitions, understood 
as the moments that precede the overtaking of a state by another in terms of 
power (in this case China catching up with the US), are prone to conflict. This is 
especially true of the cases that occur at the highest level of the international 
system, between the hegemon and an aspiring hegemon. The past record of power 
transitions is dismaying, therefore the importance of understanding the nature of 
a phenomenon which so often attracts discord and war. With history on their 
side, proponents of the ‘China threat’ theory prescribe containment strategies to 
attempt to tame its growing power (Tammen et al., 2000). The comforting news 
is that hegemonic war has not always occurred, and other scholars explain why 
we can be optimistic about the current US-China power shift – institutionalists 
claim that peaceful power transitions are indeed plausible, and in this specific case 
even likely. In their perspective, engagement, as opposed to containment, is the 
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appropriate approach to ensure a peaceful transition (Johnston and Ross, 1999). 
At the policy level, the containment versus engagement debate reflects to a large 
extent the gap which separates power transition theory and liberal-institutionalist 
theory. 
1.2 Thesis outline 
The thesis consists of five main sections, covering theory, its application to the 
case study and an assessment of results. The following paragraphs are an itinerary 
of this paper, explaining the purpose of each chapter. 
Chapters 2 and 3 are theory-based. In outlining the foundations of power 
transition theory, two critical questions are dealt with: the relationship that the 
theory establishes between power and conflict, and whether it is the rising nation 
or the declining hegemon that is expected to precipitate war, a decision which is 
linked to the sides’ degree of satisfaction with the international status quo. Equally 
important is power transition theory’s concept of power, based on military and 
economic indicators, which are helpful in determining if and when (the precise 
moment cannot be located, but an overall trend is useful enough) the US-China 
shift will occur. The chapter closes with an overview of some of the important 
revisions made to the theory since its original formulation in the 1950s. Chapter 3 
addresses the same questions in relation to liberal-institutional theory. Unlike 
power transition theory, which was specifically constructed to explain the cyclical 
occurrence of war, the contribution of the institutionalist tradition is embedded 
in a broader analysis of international relations. While never abandoning the 
materialistic approach common to both theories, power will be classified in other 
dimensions: as asymmetric dependency (interdependence), authority (hierarchical 
relations), attraction (‘soft power’), and networks (institutional power), which 
proposes substantive indicators to rank states in terms of power in a liberal-
institutionalist perspective. 
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Chapter 4 applies a set of measures coherent to the two theories’ concept of 
power to the case study. Power transition theory-related demographic, military 
and economic indicators reveal the size of the gap between the two nations over 
time in terms of ‘hard power’, allowing at the same time for a rough projection of 
crossover points in the future. The same procedure is then replicated in relation 
to the ‘liberal’ indicators, such as those assessing cultural attraction, technological 
development, human capital, and international involvement. Related to each of 
the theories, the results over time of two indexes – the Composite Index of National 
Capability and the Social Network Power Index – will then be juxtaposed for an 
assessment of the size of the disparities among them. (At that point, a closer look 
at the characteristics common to the states that top each of the lists will help to 
identify the forces which influence the models’ rankings.) Because each index gives 
a considerably different answer regarding the actual phase of the US-China power 
shift, and both cannot be ‘correct’ (whereas both can, in fact, be ‘incorrect’), a 
discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of each one follows, with a special 
focus on their suitability in measuring power at the present times. 
In Chapter 5, given that the power indicators of both theories point to China’s 
upward trajectory (albeit different perceptions of the speed and time estimated 
for the hegemon to be overtaken), an empirical analysis of China’s attitude towards 
the US and the international status quo is carried out. Assuming that there is a 
power shift in progress, findings should be consistent either with power transition 
theory (China as an increasingly aggressive challenger), liberal-institutional theory 
(an order which is capable of accommodating its rise), or mixed. China’s positions 
on a number of heated regional issues, Taiwan at the forefront, are especially 
useful in revealing its evolving attitude towards the US; on the other hand, the 
degree of involvement in the world marketplace and position towards universally-
accepted rules measure China’s level of satisfaction with the Western-led order. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 the power transition principle of attributing revisionist 
inclinations to rising challengers and a predetermined status quo orientation to 
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the hegemon is critically re-examined. After explaining the logic behind America’s 
hypothetical revisionism – an attempt to modify the rules of the international order 
that it itself created – a similar exercise to the previous section is carried out, but 
focusing instead on the hegemon’s behaviour throughout the same period of time. 
The deep changes that the 2001 terrorist attacks caused to America’s foreign 
policy and (once again) Taiwan are analysed in the light of the hegemon’s attitude 
towards China. 
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2.  The power transition theory approach 
Power transition theory (PTT), first presented by Organski (1968) and later 
fully elaborated in The War Ledger (Organski and Kugler, 1980),1 is a theory that 
attempts to explain when the conditions for the outbreak of great power war are 
to be expected. In this chapter I will present this theory’s position on the following 
points, in order from broadest to most specific: 
• Is there a causal link between power and conflict? 
• Which side is expected to initiate conflict, and why? 
• How can power be quantified, and which measure is the most adequate? 
PPT’s basic argument is tied to the dynamics of the relative power of nations, 
where the source of major war is traced basically to two causes: “the differences 
in size and rates of growth of the members of the international system” (p. 20)  
and “the general dissatisfaction [of the rising nation] with its position in the 
system” (p. 21). The main claims of the power transition model are summarised 
as follows: 
“An even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities between contending 
groups of nations is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is preserved best when 
there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged nations; 
the aggressor will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries; and it is the 
weaker, rather than the stronger, power that is most likely to be the aggressor” (p. 19). 
How PTT defines and operationalises the concept of power will be first explored. 
After, the same will be done regarding the notion of transition, an exercise which 
will allow situating this theory in the broader framework of the Realist school, 
given the differing views on power distribution and international stability. An 
overview of refinements to the theory will follow, some of which with profound 
implications for the examination of the case study. 
                                               
1 I will refer several times to this source throughout this section, given its centrality for the understanding 
of power transition theory. When I quote this particular work amid intercalated references throughout this 
chapter, I will indicate only page numbers to avoid repetitive referencing. 
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2.1 On power 
Related to Realist theory, PTT has a structural, materialistic view of power, 
as does the broad family of Liberal theories, including liberal-institutionalism 
(which I will come to in the next section). Their leaning towards tangible forms of 
power stands out by and large as an antithesis of Constructivist theory, which 
emphasises the role of ideas.2 The broad definition of the concept by power 
transition theorists is in terms with other Realist branches, such as classical 
realism and its neorealist development. Conversely, PTT distances itself from 
those branches when selecting the criteria to measure power, and how power 
shapes the structure and dynamics of the international system. 
Morgenthau, a classical realist, defines power as “man’s control over the minds 
and actions of other men” (1967: 26); Organski and Kugler as “the ability of one 
nation to control the behaviour of another for its own ends” (1980: 30). These 
definitions match each other, apart from the focus on different levels of analysis: 
classical realists focus on the actions of individuals, while PPT is inclined towards 
the other ‘images’ of international relations (national and systemic) observed by 
Waltz (1959). Although the understanding of how it affects the dynamics of the 
international system differs from the typical neorealist perspective, we can find a 
rough overlap with PTT’s view on power. Waltz refuses to weigh elements of 
power separately (1979: 131), but the nature of his security-orientated analysis 
seemingly emphasises the weight of the distribution of economic, and especially 
military, capacity among states as key in defining the structure of the system. The 
same applies to the offensive branch of structural realism, where war, conquest, 
and power are, too, closely connected with each other (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
Although both PTT and the classic realists emphasise the state-centric nature 
of the international system, their approach to power in general and the elements 
of national power in particular do not totally overlap. Juxtaposing the elements of 
                                               
2 For a short but informative comparison of the three major international relations’ theoretical paradigms, 
see Walt (1998). 
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national power applied by PTT models with those suggested by Morgenthau 
further highlights their materialistic nature. While the latter includes fine-grained 
components (but very hard to test) such as national character, national morale, 
the quality of diplomacy, and the quality of government (ibid, Ch. 9),3 the former 
approves the Singer-Bremer-Stuckey (SBS) measure based on industrial, military 
and demographic capacity,4 but employs instead the simple measure of gross 
national product (GNP). This is done because not only this option yields roughly 
the same results as the SBS measure, but it is also easier to apply and the data 
used to assemble it is more reliable (p. 38). For that reason, Organski and Kugler 
prefer to equate power with GNP. 
In fact, the parsimonious way in which power is measured stands as a clear 
advantage in the operationalisation of the concept. But how can power transition 
theorists justify GNP alone as an adequate measure of power overall? They believe 
that it captures the essential variables in the building up of national resources, and 
relate GNP to other indicators: “the fraction of population of working and fighting 
ages, and the level of productivity”, which accurately reflect “levels of technology, 
education, capital intensity [and] the capacity to pay for external security”, i.e. the 
level of military expenditures (p. 33). 
At this point, one important caveat must be mentioned: national capabilities 
are only adequate for measuring power among developed countries (p. 68), not in 
the traditional meaning of the term, but rather those nations in which the elites 
have the ability “to extract the human and material resources from their societies, 
aggregate the many contributions each citizen makes into national pools, and use 
them for national purposes” (p. 71). As the definition suggests, PTT’s ‘political 
development’ does not have a normative connotation either, a fact which becomes 
                                               
3 Morgenthau’s other elements of national power are geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, 
military preparedness, and population. 
4 The measures used for industrial capacity are energy consumption; military expenditure and standing 
army for military capacity; at last, total population and population in cities with a population over 20,000. 
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more explicit as Organski and Kugler translate this measure into governmental 
extraction in the form of tax effort (p. 85).5 
In short, the problematic concept of power is operationalised by equating it 
with national capabilities, which in turn are quantified through the coupling of a 
socio-economic index (GNP) with a political development index (tax effort). This is 
the bulk of the measure of national capabilities proposed by PTT. 
2.2 On transitions 
Transitions among the limited group of contenders and great powers in the 
international central system, and how they affect its stability, are key elements of 
power transition theorists’ research.6 The first step is to underline PTT’s departure 
from other realist branches on the understanding of which disposition of power 
among major players is presumably more stable. This introduction will be useful 
to clarify the consequences of power shifts according to the theory. 
Both classical and structural realists use balance of power theory to explain 
and predict great power behaviour. Morgenthau believes that such a configuration 
is “inevitable” and “an essential stabilising factor” for the international order (ibid, 
161). In the same line of reasoning, Waltz highlights the anarchical structure of the 
system, and the ultimate aim of survival, as the forces that dictate strategies to 
avoid concentration of power through internal or external balancing (increasing 
economic and military strength or alliance formation, respectively) (ibid, pp. 116-
128). Organski and Kugler, on the other hand, share a different view of stability, 
                                               
5 The value of aid from abroad is also included in order to produce more accurate data for cross-national 
analyses. Thus, the full measure of national capabilities can be summed up as (GNP x Tax Effort) + (Foreign 
Aid x Tax Effort of Recipient). I have omitted slight adjustments that serve the purpose of conferring more 
relative weight to GNP over Tax Effort. For a more detailed breakdown of the formula, see pp. 85-86. 
6 The core task of the previous section was to explore PTT’s definition and operationalisation of power. On 
the other hand, the meaning of transition is uncontroversial and can be found in a dictionary entry; in this 
context, the moment when a nation’s position in the power rank shifts. Rather than a definitional problem, 
it is the effects of transitions to the international system that require investigation. 
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based on hierarchical relationships.7 At the outset, PTT downplays the importance 
of alliances because the main source of power lies inside nations’ borders (p. 24). 
Then, it notes that periods of stability take place when one nation dominates the 
system, not when an equal distribution of power exists (p. 25). This view is shared 
by the liberal idea of collective security, which claims that asymmetric relations 
are more stable: both agree that “the power distribution must be lopsided in 
favour of the defenders of the system and against the nations that wish to attack 
it” (p. 27). Here, we can note a clear tendency of PTT in equating dominant powers 
with a status quo attitude, and rising nations with revisionism. Anyhow, in highly 
tense transitional moments, both sides will be likely to reveal aggressiveness, 
although the attacker will most likely be the ascending power. In Organski and 
Kugler’s words: 
“...there is a period during which both dominant and challenging nations are roughly equal in 
power. The challenger has finally caught up with the dominant country, passage is a reality, 
and the elites on both sides view the shifts in power as threatening ... it is an attempt to 
hasten this passage that leads the faster-growing nation to attack” (p. 28). 
The risk of a military confrontation increases when the power gap between the 
dominant and the challenging nation develops in a fast pace, thus “disturbing the 
equilibrium that existed theretofore [as] both parties will be unprepared for the 
resulting shift” (p. 21). Thus, the probability of war peaks when the power shift is 
about to occur. PTT’s findings of an empirical study on the relationship between 
power distribution and the incidence of conflicts tell us more. While it is not 
possible to spot a pattern at the major power level (nations placed at the centre of 
the system but still distant from the top of the hierarchy), at the contender level 
the picture is clearer: war does not occur when the power distribution is under 
the “unequal” or “equal, no overtaking” cases, but the odds increase from zero to 
                                               
7 In a theoretical account on the typologies of realism, Feng and Ruizhuang (2006: 129-132) trace a line 
between two separate branches: hegemonic realism which, besides power transition theory, also includes 
hegemonic stability theory and long cycle leadership theory, and balance of power realism, where one can 
group classical realism, neo-realism, offensive/defensive realism and neo-classical realism. On the other 
hand, PTT differs from the above hegemonic realist theories insomuch as it concentrates not only on the 
systemic but also the dyadic level of analysis (DiCicco and Levy 1999: 680). 
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0.5 when there is an equal distribution of power and one of the contenders is in 
the process of overtaking the other (see pp. 49-53; Annex I).8 With these findings 
in mind, Organski and Kugler confidently state that although this process is not a 
sufficient condition for conflict (as war does not always result from it), power 
shifts are a necessary condition for the outbreak of hostilities (p. 51). 
As has been mentioned earlier, the degree of satisfaction of the challenger is a 
crucial factor in determining the consequences of power transitions. This runs 
contrary to balance of power theory, which in a physics-like manner predicts 
concrete counterbalancing strategies whenever power asymmetries begin to 
shape. PTT posits that major war will only occur if the challenger has the “desire 
to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work” (p. 23). Therefore, 
the kind of outcome of a transition depends on whether the challenger’s political 
elites have revisionist agendas or are status quo oriented. 
I have outlined PTT’s observations on the destabilising role of power shifts in 
international politics, particularly at the contender level: different growth rates 
and dissatisfied challengers are the two key variables in determining the outbreak 
of war. Next, I will look at the attempts to refine the original theory and how some 
of its assumptions have been questioned by other power transition theorists. 
2.3 Refinements and alternative propositions 
Since the release of The War Ledger, the realist contention that shifting power 
balances are a key factor among the causes of war and peace has been analysed 
and tested. This research has contributed to some refinements of PTT but also 
major alternative proposals to the theory’s basic tenets. 
First, it is striking that Organski and Kugler did not attempt to operationalise 
‘satisfaction with the status quo’ which is, together with dyadic relative power 
                                               
8 For the relevance of the case under study, I choose not to dwell on the data for the incidence of conflict in 
power distributions along the periphery of the central system. Moreover, resembling the case of major 
powers, the data is inconclusive. 
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dynamics, at the core of PTT. Kim (1991) tries to fill this gap by putting forward a 
measure that equates it with the degree of similarity of the alliances of the 
dominant power and the challenger. His findings show that the bigger the overlap 
of alliance commitments, the lesser the risk of a dispute. In a more materialistic 
tone, Lemke and Werner (1996: 240) associate challengers’ military build-ups with 
satisfaction, the relative size of the two actors’ military build-ups as a signal of 
their respective commitment to change or stability. Thus, an unusual growth in 
military expenditure suggests that the rising power has the resolve to resort to 
force to dislodge the hegemon from its dominant position. Yet, these proposals are 
not immune to criticism. For instance, a state that pursues an isolationist strategy 
could give rise to groundless fears, thus creating a ‘false positive’; alternatively, a 
military build-up could be directed inside the state’s own borders. Regardless of 
their weaknesses, these contributions are a good starting point towards making 
satisfaction a manageable concept.9 
DiCicco and Levy (1999) identify three major refinements of PTT: the multiple 
hierarchy model, the alliance transitions model, and the timing and initiations of 
war. The first one, aimed at bringing the theory to comprise power transitions to 
lesser powers, is interesting insomuch as it allows the theory to be applied to a 
wider number of cases, but less relevant to this case study. The alliance transitions 
model, developed by Kim (1989), rebuffs Organski and Kugler’s neglecting of the 
role of alliances in the incidence of major wars. Kim’s work rejects both balance of 
power and power transition models, his findings showing evidence that equal 
power among alliances (and not dyadic symmetrical power) is critical to the onset 
of conflict. Ultimately, his contribution carries the fundamental implication that, 
contrary to PTT’s earlier propositions, the effects of external balancing deserve 
more attention, and not only the study of pairs of states observed in isolation. 
                                               
9 Other measures that may provide an assessment of the level of satisfaction with the status quo within 
contenders are proposed by Chan (2008: Ch. 3), such as the ratio of intergovernmental organisations 
membership, veto frequency of the permanent members in the United Nation’s Security Council, or the 
ratification of major international human rights treaties. These indicators will be used and discussed in 
Chapters 4 to 6. 
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This alternative approach marks a departure from the established assumptions of 
the theory’s original formulation. 
The third development of PTT identified by DiCicco and Levy, which is the 
most relevant for this paper’s purpose, is the timing and initiation of war. Organski 
and Kugler’s answers to the who, when, and why questions are not entirely clear: 
based on their empirical analyses, the eruption of conflict happens only after the 
challenger has moved beyond the intersection point of its rival in terms of power 
(p. 60). They then suggest that the challenger initiates war because the declining 
hegemon, who is still taking advantage of the status quo that serves its interests, 
wishes to sustain a disproportionate amount of influence. In turn, this state of 
affairs is no longer accepted by the challenger that wants benefits equivalent to 
its present power status, thus pushing it to initiate war against the dominant 
power (pp. 19-20, quoted from Organski 1968: 364-367). 
This explanation is controversial. Levy (1989: 253) questions why PTT expects 
the challenger to initiate war, suggesting that “the leading state may launch a 
“preventive war” in an attempt to block or retard the rise of the challenger while 
the opportunity is still available”.10 Chan (2008: Ch. 4) further elaborates the 
rationale for one to expect the declining hegemon to initiate a preventive war, 
rather than the overconfident challenger. He shares Levy’s view and backs his 
argument with rationalist explanations for war. Albeit the extremely high costs of 
war, the declining power is likely to engage in misrepresentation (transitions are 
periods of great uncertainty) as it feels the urge to defend its vested interests; the 
latecomer, on the other hand, has the incentive to remain in the shadow as its 
strength develops. This logic is also in terms with prospect theory, which expects 
the challenger to adopt prudent behaviour (those who are in the profiting side 
are typically risk-averse), while the declining hegemon is willing to employ risky 
policies in a desperate attempt to avoid further relative losses. In this way, Chan 
                                               
10 However, in a later study on preventive wars, Lemke (2003) identifies a series of cases in which the 
motive for that kind of conflict was present, concluding that only in a very few number of cases did war 
actually occur – both with regard to the contender level and the remaining states. 
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turns the tables around, as the challenger is satisfied with its incremental gains 
while the hegemon’s decline may cause it to seek a preventive war.11 In Chapter 6 
this hypothesis will be discussed. 
The abovementioned refinements to PTT have contributed to the theory’s 
ripening, with several of the unexplored concepts and propositions presented in 
The War Ledger being developed into workable elements of analysis. In other 
cases, such as the importance of alliance patterns assigned by Kim, but especially 
Chan’s roles’ reversal regarding satisfaction and propensity for conflict initiation, 
we are in the face of a profound reshaping of the fundamental assumptions of 
Organski and Kugler’s power transition model. 
                                               
11 Finally, evidence has also been presented suggesting that greater or lesser risk of war is not foreseeable 
through the observation of power distribution analyses. Bueno de Mesquita’s (1981) study showing no 
statistical significance between this variable (ranging from scenarios of power preponderance to power 
parity) and conflict raises question marks over a core tenet of PTT. 
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3. The liberal-institutionalist approach 
In the previous chapter, I investigated the connection between PTT and the 
Realist school of thought, the theory’s conception of power, and the relationship 
between power transitions and conflict. Now, I will attempt to answer the same 
questions in regard to a liberal-institutionalist approach. The challenge in doing 
so lies in the absence of explicit answers in this theory’s literature. However, an 
analysis to its theoretical foundations and some reading between the lines give us 
important insights in understanding how the concept of power can be worked 
upon, the power-conflict causal link, and which side (if any) is expected to initiate 
conflict during the course of a power transition. 
Liberal-institutionalist theory (LIT), like PTT, operates at the systemic level 
of analysis. Liberal-institutionalists share with the realist school a materialistic 
view of power, but approach the concept in a more sophisticated manner. Besides 
acknowledging the relevance of measures of raw capabilities such as military 
spending and economic output to assess the power of states, they bring to light 
additional variables and issues whose impact in the relations among great powers 
deserves close attention. In this section, after outlining LIT’s concept of power in 
generic terms, I will focus on the notion of complex interdependence; international 
regimes and institutions; power as authority; and power as networks. The scope of 
LIT will be broadened as the chapter advances, with an interchanging emphasis on 
its liberal and institutional expressions. Afterwards, as done previously, the risks 
involved in power transition periods will be discussed, this time under a liberal-
institutionalist lens. 
3.1 On power 
Regardless of the adequacy of its idea of power, PTT has been able to quantify 
it very exact terms by ascribing a value to each state, allowing them to be ranked, 
and their relative positions vis-à-vis others analysed over periods of time. LIT is, 
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too, capable of performing that task with operational precision. How, then, does 
it view power, and secondly, how does it manage to quantify it? 
Power can be conceived as the ability of an actor to get others “to do what 
they otherwise would not do” and as “control over outcomes” (Keohane and Nye 
1989: 12), which is closely linked to the notion of asymmetrical interdependence, 
i.e. one of the sides in a given relationship is less affected than its partner(s) when 
confronted with a change in that relationship. In interdependence, the role of 
power is understood in two elements: ‘sensitivity’ and ‘vulnerability’ (ibid, 12-13). 
A state whose degree of sensitivity is high will experience costly effects when 
there is an outside policy change; if it is highly vulnerable too, that state will find 
it hard to react to that change. The dimension of vulnerability contributes more to 
the understanding of the relationship between interdependence and power than 
that of sensitivity, as only the lack of alternatives on one side provides power 
resources to the other (p. 15).12 
Resources are a result of “asymmetries in dependence”. Relationships of pure 
symmetry or pure dependency are rare; the term interdependence encompasses 
situations in which the degree of mutual dependence varies, the less dependent 
party disposing of more power to influence issues that affect the more dependent 
party (pp. 10-11). International negotiations illustrate this reality: the outcome of 
bargaining processes is a function of each side’s aggregate and issue-specific 
power. This relates to Richard Emerson’s (among others) social exchange theory, 
whose foundations were swiftly incorporated into LIT’s framework of power. 
Emerson put forward a way of determining the power structure of interdependent 
relationships and their degree of asymmetry, based on the magnitude of A’s 
                                               
12 For example, both the US and Germany would be sensitive to a radical cut in oil production agreed by 
OPEC. However, and supposing that both imported the same share of oil from those countries (thus being 
equally sensitive to the change), Germany’s ‘vulnerability interdependence’ would be much higher due to 
its reduced access to alternatives; on the other hand, the US would be less vulnerable, as it could cope 
with that policy change more easily, relying on its own oil reserves to fulfil its consumption demands (at 
least in the short-run). This case illustrates how the assessment of vulnerability is more revealing than 
sensitivity alone. 
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interest for outcome x, the extent of B’s control of x, and the ability of A to find 
alternatives (Habeeb 1988: 20). Presented in bilateral terms for the analysis of 
bargaining situations, this approach to power is extensible to interstate relations 
in the multilateral level. 
Next, we will see in what other ways LIT goes beyond structural realism by 
adding extra shades to the concept other than what can be considered its ‘power-
as-dependency’ original element. Then, I will present three other notions of power 
closely linked to LIT (two of them more ‘liberal’, the other more ‘institutionalist’). 
3.1.1 Complex interdependence and international regimes 
Keohane and Nye (1989) develop the concept of complex interdependence 
against the existing realist framework. Both are considered ideal types, and the 
‘situations’ occurring in the international system fall somewhere in between the  
two extremes, and may be better explained by one or the other (ibid, 24). In 
complex interdependence, states are connected by multiple channels: interstate 
relations are not neglected, but paired with transgovernmental and transnational 
relations, thus relaxing the realist assumption that states are unitary and their 
actions purely independent. Secondly, the assumption of a hierarchy in which 
military issues are dominant over economic and social issues is rejected, in the 
same way as the split between foreign and domestic policy is often unclear.  
Therefore, in scenarios of complex interdependence, military power is negligible, 
even though it may be vital in relations outside that area (p. 25).13 In the realist 
lens’ purest form, all issue areas are subordinated to military security and its 
implications; liberal-institutionalists reject this judgement in favour of an all-
inclusive view on political processes, emphasising the potential for issue linkage. 
As a result, power resides in the “manipulation of interdependence, international 
organisations, and transnational actors” (p. 37). Since different sources of power 
                                               
13 The relations between states in the developed North would be a case in point. For instance, US military 
power does not play a role of any kind in its negotiations with Canada over economic issues. Conversely, 
it is certainly a dominant issue in the American interactions with North Korea or Iran. 
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add complexity to relations and outcomes, international organisations (IOs), acting 
both within and across states, play a major role: their flexibility in issue linkage 
and agenda formation, according to Keohane and Nye, benefit the weaker rather 
than the stronger states (ibid). 
More broadly, international regimes cover both formal IOs and codified rules 
and norms (Keohane 1989: vii).14 They carve an even greater analytical distinction 
in relation to realist analyses, which prioritise the security realm. LIT, as suggested 
above, considers that security and political economy should be paired under the 
same analytical framework (Keohane and Martin 1995: 43). International regimes 
are defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations” (Krasner 1983: 2). In these “social institutions”, as Keohane 
calls them, (implicit) rules and (explicit) norms are closely knit, that connection 
giving regimes their legitimacy (1984: 57). The essence of international regimes 
lies in the “injunctions that are both specific enough that violations of them are in 
principle identifiable and that changes in them can be observed, and sufficiently 
significant that changes in them make a difference for the behaviour of actors and 
the nature of the international political economy” (ibid, 59). Despite the ‘state of 
anarchy’ that is characteristic of the international system, in which self-help and 
the principle of sovereignty make it impossible for a legal system to impose them, 
these obligations are usually met. The nature of international regimes is influenced 
by the most powerful states’ general preferences; this does not, however, dismiss 
their significance in facilitating cooperation. Regimes affect both state behaviour 
(Keohane 1989: 10) and state interests, for they “not only are consistent with self-
interest but may under some conditions even be necessary to its effective pursuit” 
(Keohane 1984: 63). 
                                               
14 Institutions are defined as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe 
behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”. They can be formal organisations, which are 
“bureaucratic organisations” (e.g. the United Nations); international regimes, which constitute “negotiated 
orders” (e.g. arms control regimes); and conventions, with “implicit rules and understandings” (ibid, 3-4). 
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IOs are very convenient instruments where the most powerful states can 
benefit from cooperation, because “their character is structured by the prevailing 
distribution of capabilities” (Keohane and Martin 1995: 47). Yet, the dominant 
nation (to use PTT terms) does end up tying itself to an institutionalised system – 
the abovementioned state of ‘complex interdependence’ – where considerations 
of physical capabilities lose much of their weight. This, in turn, allows influence 
to be exerted through diplomatic norms, institutionalised transnational financial 
networks and alliances (Keohane 1989: 9). In any case, both the material aspect of 
power, exercised through the manipulation of material incentives (via threats and 
rewards), and the shaping of substantive beliefs (through the adoption of norms 
and values) are two ways of exercising hegemonic power which are “mutually 
reinforcing and frequently difficult to disentangle” (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 
286). Thus, the transmission of these substantive beliefs from the leading power 
to the secondary states, translated into a body of norms and rules that Keohane 
describes more generally as international regimes, is an exercise of power which 
complements the traditional role of raw, materialistic power described in the last 
chapter. Both lead to the consolidation of hegemonic power (ibid), a vision that 
seems to be consistent with the basic expectations of hegemonic stability theory. 
3.1.2 Power as authority 
Another notion of power closely related to LIT (mostly in its liberal-ideational 
dimension) is that of authority. It “locates legitimacy in a social contract between a 
ruler, who provides a social order of value to the ruled, and the ruled, who comply 
with the ruler’s commands necessary to the production of that order” (Lake 2009: 
331-332). Instead of an anarchical environment, international relations are made 
up of various hierarchies in which authority is founded in ‘the ability to get things 
done’ by the powerful nations, and is therefore legitimate. Although neither the 
leading states are obligated to provide for social order, nor the weaker are 
effectively coerced to comply, both sides will prefer that ‘social contract’ as long 
as they are marginally better off than if they were to cooperate under anarchy 
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(ibid, 334-336). As we will observe later on, the logic behind relational authority 
is linked to the creation and maintenance of order. 
How can authority as power be measured? Lake (2007) proposes to assess the 
degree of authority of a state towards others, making sure that authority is not 
misrepresented as coercive capabilities, which would be an obvious pitfall. In 
trying to isolate the legitimacy of the unequal relationships between states, two 
indexes – security and economic hierarchy – capture the level of subordination of 
each country relative to a major power. The first one combines deployment of 
military forces from the dominant country to each subordinate state, and the 
number of independent alliances the weaker state belongs to, which reflects 
foreign policy autonomy; the second index consists of the degree of autonomy of 
the subordinated states’ monetary policy (determined by their exchange rate  
regime), and relative trade dependence.15 The scores for each dimension are then 
translated into security and economic continuums ranging from ‘diplomacy’ to 
‘protectorate’ and ‘market exchange’ to ‘dependency’ respectively. 
3.1.3 Power as attraction 
In what other ways does LIT try to assemble a more comprehensive set of 
indicators than those of PTT when measuring national power? While Organski and 
Kugler resorted solely to GNP and tax effort measures (assuring accuracy over 
long time periods and easy operationality), LIT looks at the state immersed in the 
international context rather than isolated from its peers. This departure from 
traditional power measures opens new avenues in the way power is conceived. 
‘Soft power’, a term coined by Nye (1990), helps to put into perspective traditional 
power resources by suggesting that less tangible instruments of power grasp the 
nature of relations in an interdependent world best. Economic interdependence, 
transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and 
                                               
15 For a more detailed description of how the measures of each index are aggregated and translated to a  
scatter plot chart, and some reflections on the validity and reliability of the data gathered, see pp. 62-69. 
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changing political issues were the “trends” that played a role in the mismatch 
between nations’ power in traditional terms and its effectiveness in practice (ibid, 
160).16 Cultural attraction, ideology and international institutions are highlighted 
as ‘soft power’ resources (p. 167). 
Measuring the ‘power to attract’, in spite of its intangibility, is not necessarily 
an impossible task and may be no harder than quantifying the traditional military-
economic dimensions (ibid, 2006). Social indices such as a state’s immigrant 
population, international students and tourists, and film and music dissemination 
abroad measure cultural attraction. Polls assess a country’s popularity, although 
results are quite volatile (see Nye, 2004). Membership in IOs, alliances, and troops 
deployed overseas are examples of measures which reveal the states’ level of  
involvement internationally.17 Likewise, attempts have been made to study power 
as a continuum, stretching from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ instead of dichotomously. Rothman 
(2011) presents power resources varying in their degree of ‘softness’: military 
(coercion), economic (inducement), institutional (agenda setting) and rhetoric/ 
success (attraction). While military power is inherently hard, economic resources 
may be exercised in ‘harder’ (e.g. an economic embargo) and ‘softer’ ways (e.g. 
the allocation of foreign investment). Hence, the author’s view that the ‘hard-soft’ 
divide is inadequate for capturing reality. 
3.1.4 Power as networks 
So far, I presented Lake’s notions and measures of ‘power as authority’ and 
Nye’s ‘power as attraction’ as liberal dimensions of LIT. Social network theory – 
‘power as networks’ – applied to international relations, on the other hand, tries 
to operationalise and measure its institutional character. 
                                               
16 More recently, Nye has described power three-dimensionally: military, economic, and “transnational 
relations” (2010: 2). 
17 If the merits of Lake’s measures of ‘power as authority’ are recognised, we understand that although 
some of the variables proposed may seem promising in operationalising soft power, they are at best a good 
starting point. To become convincing measures, they should be integrated in a more robust framework. 
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Networks, defined as “sets of relations that form structures” (Hafner-Burton, 
Kahler and Montgomery 2009: 560), help identifying relationship patterns among 
agents. The theory posits that structural relations are, at least, as important as the 
individual characteristics of the units that compose them (ibid, 561), which runs 
in clear opposition to the neorealist approach to structures. Network analysis 
focuses on the links among nodes (states, in this case) that form webs of relations. 
Links can consist, for example, of joint membership in IOs; ties are then assessed 
in terms of centrality of nodes and in subgroup division within the network. 
Measures of centrality include degree (the sum of a node’s incoming ties), 
eigenvector (the weight of tie values and centrality), closeness (the length of the 
path between a node and every other node) betweenness (the number of shortest 
paths through a particular node), and information (strength of connection). As with 
centrality, there are several ways of measuring subgroup division, which basically 
consists of summing up ties and assessing their density and similarity. Subgroup 
division is twofold: cohesion can be measured as “cliques” (groups in which ties 
among each of the nodes are over a minimum value); similarity can be calculated 
as “structural equivalence” (a cluster in which all nodes have the same number of 
ties with every other node in the network).18 
In the figure below, four states are connected through membership in six IOs. 
In the affiliation matrix, we can see to which IOs each state belongs to. In the 
sociomatrix, also replicated graphically, we can see the shape of the connections 
within this network. Which state is the most powerful will depend on which 
definition of centrality is employed (ibid, 570). For instance, state A scores highest 
in “degree” centrality, with 8 ties (5+3). However, state C is the only one connected 
to the other three nodes, so it has the highest score for “betweenness” centrality. 
Different measures draw us to different power resources: in this case, the state 
with a high “degree” centrality has a greater ability to manipulate agenda-setting 
                                               
18 For a more thorough description on each of the measures proposed for centrality and subgroup division, 
see pp. 563-566. 
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in its own benefit, whereas the leading state in “betweenness” is in a vital position 
to bridge one or more nodes to a wider network (ibid). In terms of subgroup 
division, states A, B, and C form the most cohesive subgroup (with two cliques), 
but there is no structural equivalence among them. 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Example of an international network 
Kim (2009) proposes the Social Network Power Index (SNPI) for measuring 
national power, and compares it to the Composite Index of National Capability 
(CINC).19 While the latter equates power to attributes (demographic, industrial 
and military), independent of other nations and of the structure of the system, the 
former is based on variables of network power, which reflect both states’ power 
relative to each other, and how they are positioned in the international system. 
Six data sets are used to measure international interactions: diplomatic exchanges, 
foreign student exchanges, international telecommunications, arms transfers,  
international exports, and international assistance (Kim, 2010). Using network 
theory to determine centrality (in its competing versions), the SNPI is able to 
bring together and operationalise the notion of complex interdependence (e.g.  
diplomatic exchanges), ‘soft power’ variables (e.g. student exchanges), and possibly 
relational authority (e.g. international assistance). 
                                               
19 The CINC index, developed for the Correlates of War project, uses ratios of states’ total population, urban 
population, iron and steel production, primary energy consumption, military expenditure and military 
personnel (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972). 
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3.2 On transitions 
How can power transitions therefore occur, and how peaceful can we expect 
them to be? Realist theory alone does not explain why the hegemonic state loses 
the grip on its privileged position in the hierarchy. Ikenberry and Kupchan state 
that “socialization may be a key component in understanding the functioning of 
and change within hegemonic systems” (1990: 286), and Keohane adds that the 
strongest do not always benefit from the rules of the system which they themselves 
created (1989: 49). Instead of looking at whether material balancing is feasible or 
not, LIT favours other ‘weapons’ which contending powers can resort to. At the 
centre of liberal-institutionalists’ analysis are the non-material attributes of the 
leading and aspiring nations, and the character of the international order. 
Ikenberry’s institutional theory looks closely at how post-war orders are 
shaped by its leading states. Having to decide between dominating the weaker 
units by force, abandoning them, or creating a mutually acceptable post-war order, 
they usually choose the last option. The driving force behind self-restraint is the 
prospect of conserving power in a long-term perspective, as an institutionalised 
order adds predictability and lowers the secondary states’ fear of domination or 
abandonment. All together, ‘maintenance costs’ drop (a legitimate order produces 
fewer challengers), and in the long run the resilience of rules and institutions will 
still benefit the most powerful even after they experience decline (2001: 51-56). 
Nevertheless, Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth (2009) suggest that when 
one state clearly sits at the top of the hierarchy, its dominance will paradoxically 
weaken compared to less unbalanced system structures. Hard balancing by a rising 
state, or alliance formation, may be unrealistic – as long as the leading nation does 
not employ extreme aggressiveness – so soft balancing is a more effective tool in 
seeking to limit the ability of the dominant power in imposing its preferences 
(Walt 2009: 104). The distribution of capabilities does not per se determine the 
execution (and intensity) of counterbalancing strategies pointed at the leading 
state. This greatly depends on who it is, its geographical position and what kind of 
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ambitions it has (ibid, 120).20 Thus, an a priori prediction of actions by potential 
challengers (and reactions of the top dog) is not possible to devise. It is, however, 
noticeable that weaker states, rather than balancing in conventional (material) 
terms, may erode the authority of the leader by taking advantage of the “internal 
logics” and “impersonal character” of the rules and institutions which it created 
both to serve its own interests and legitimise its power (Finnermore 2009: 60). 
Ultimately, institutionalising power diffuses it, leading towards loss of control 
over the web of institutions, entrapment of the hegemon and even its punishment 
(ibid, 68-72). This quasi-autonomous role of institutional restraints against the 
material capabilities of states introduces a social element to the material structure 
of international politics. 
Institutional theory suggests that the world is not doomed to stage cyclical 
hegemonic wars. In a scenario of a power transition, or its imminence, liberal- 
institutionalists, instead of jumping into the question “who will initiate conflict?” 
first ask themselves whether there is substantial ground to fear the outbreak of a 
hegemonic war. Ikenberry (2008) points out that there are different types of 
power transitions, and not all of them generate war – ascending states may or 
may not challenge the current order. Contrary to PTT, considerations other than 
power indexes are believed to influence the wind-up of power transitions: the 
nature of the rising power’s regime (a liberal challenger will behave differently 
from an undemocratic one), the degree of its dissatisfaction (treated as a variable 
rather than as a given), and most importantly, the character of the international 
order itself (p. 27).21 LIT clearly understands the causal link between power and 
                                               
20 A physically distant dominant power (e.g. the US) is less likely to engage in counterbalancing actions 
than one dominant power that is surrounded by rivals (e.g. a particular European nation in the Euro-centric 
era). In the same way, a hegemon with restrained ambitions will encounter less resistance than one that 
reveals greater aggressiveness. 
21 Ikenberry gives examples of power transitions among liberal powers that did not result in violent conflict 
(the US’ overtaking of Britain in the beginning of the twentieth century, or Japan’s closing in in the second 
half of that century without that ever leading it to challenge the existing order), while power transitions 
among liberal powers and non-liberal ones were marked by great tension (e.g. the pre-World War I friction 
between Britain and Germany). 
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conflict in a more elastic way, accepting a wider range of outcomes in transition 
periods. 
Related to Lake’s ‘power as authority’, based on a consented ‘social contract’ 
made up of basic values and conventions, Kupchan et al. (2001) note that peaceful 
power transitions are possible, but highly dependent on legitimacy grounded 
upon values and institutional mechanisms. The goal of international orders is not 
to pursue absolute stability, but to operate under “socialised instability” (p. 70), 
thus leaving room for change in non-violent terms. It is also vital that the dominant 
nations enjoy domestic legitimacy, as their domestic and international agendas 
are blended (p. 71). With this in mind, the biggest test for a hegemon is its ability 
to accommodate shifts in its relative power. As long as both the rising power and 
the declining hegemon perceive each other as legitimate, it is conceivable that the 
latter accepts the loss of its top dog status. When there is a “common identity and 
shared sense of benign character” (p. 29) smooth transitions can occur, while the 
contender will have to manage the international order in terms acceptable for 
both sides. 
Examples in which ‘order’ was negotiated (not necessarily with success) can 
be found in recent history. In a survey of past power transitions, Khong applies 
three variables which hypothetically explain in what conditions they can unfold 
peacefully: “affinity”, “participatory equality”, and “non-pushover” (p. 37). If the 
challenger shares cultural and identity traits with the hegemon, if it is ready (to a 
certain extent) to preserve the falling power’s status and privileges (what Coicaud, 
in the same volume, calls “democratic hegemony”), and if it is not easily defeated or 
taken advantage of, the conditions for a non-violent power transition are met.22 
                                               
22 Khong’s study focuses on the outcomes in the Asian Pacific region. Rising Japan/declining “West” in the 
late nineteenth century, and rising Indonesia/declining Malaysia (supported by the British) in the 1950s 
are examples of power transitions that did not fulfil any of the above conditions. On the other hand, the 
case of a rising US/declining Britain in the beginning of the twentieth century is a successful one. Democratic 
affinity and agreement on a new hierarchy (based on reciprocity in trade, agreed spheres of influence, use 
of force and management of territories) were decisive elements for the peaceful outcome (see pp. 39-54). 
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In this chapter, I approached LIT’s broad power framework and its several 
dimensions: after introducing Keohane and Nye’s notion of power as dependency, 
I overviewed authority and its hierarchy of subordination; the ‘softer’, less tangible 
measures of attraction; and finally networks, assessing power through a range of 
different types of ties among states. Then, regarding transition events, it became 
clear that liberal-institutionalists are less pessimistic on the likelihood of a violent 
conflict occurring between a declining hegemon and the overtaking challenger 
than power transition theorists. 
With the theoretical reflections provided by PTT and LIT on the background, 
the remaining chapters will deal individually with each of the following questions 
on the US-China case study: 
• Can a crossover point between China and the US be observed, or predicted? 
• Are there grounds to consider China an unsatisfied challenger, or the contrary? 
• Is the proposition of US, as a declining hegemon, being inclined to strike first in 
order to maintain its dominant position in the international order, defensible? 
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4. An assessment of China’s rise 
China’s rapid growth after the Cold War has been looked upon by analysts 
with enthusiasm and apprehension. In most cases, the debate has been centred 
on when China will overtake the US rather than if that will occur; predictions vary 
significantly.23 As I demonstrated, PTT focuses heavily on industrial productivity, 
military strength and demography as power components; on the other side, LIT 
claims to offer a richer understanding of power in the contemporary world with its 
more nuanced view of the concept, combining precision and abstractness, which 
nevertheless can be operationalised. In the next sections, measures of power from 
both theories will be applied to the case study, with special attention given to the 
Composite Index of National Capacity and the Structural Network Power Index. 
A discussion on the merits and weaknesses of each will follow. 
4.1 Power transition theory 
In The War Ledger, as I have mentioned earlier, Organski and Kugler coupled 
indicators of economic power (GNP) with political power (tax effort) to measure 
national capabilities. To test power transitions, the SBS index, with a combination 
of demographic, industrial, and military capabilities, was employed. Yet, because 
the scores arrived at matched closely those of GNP alone, this indicator prevailed. 
Ever since, alternative measures of national capabilities – with their focus, too, on 
raw capabilities – have been developed, such as the CINC (to which I refer later) 
and the Doran and Parsons’ relative capability index (DiCicco and Levy 1999: 689). 
For now, I will backtrack and breakup the progress of the US and China for the 
past two decades – a basis for projecting into the future – in three ‘hard power’ 
                                               
23 A wide range of estimates, some more specific than others, are found in the literature and media: 2019 
(Morrison, 2009), 2030 (Maddison, 2006), 2020-2050 (Kugler and Tammen, 2004), to mention just a few. 
The years/periods forecasted are invariably linked to the industrial-economic element of power, which is 
unsurprising given that in terms of population China already has a big advantage over the US, and in the 
military realm US superiority is so immense that it discourages any confident guess on a future transition. 
The discrepancy of the predictions results primarily from different methods of calculating GDP. 
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fields: demographic power (population), industrial-economic power (GDP), and 
military power (military expenditure).24 
4.1.1 Demographic power 
This component of power, whose importance is highly regarded by PTT due 
to its potential for enhancing economic development and military capabilities, is 
China’s great strength vis-à-vis the US, with a population roughly four and a half 
times larger. Although China’s population is still rising slightly, a small decrease 
in its growth rate can be observed over the past two decades (see Annex II), with 
a peak and decrease projected to happen in the beginning of the 2030s (United 
Nations, 2007). On the contrary, the American population has increased at a fairly 
constant rate over the past fifty years (1% in average) and, according to the same 
projections, that trend will not be disturbed until 2050. Yet, even if the optimistic 
negative growth forecast for China’s population is confirmed, discussions centred 
around ‘closing a gap’ in this power component would be exaggerated, as in 2050 
it would still have a population three and half times larger. 
4.1.2 Industrial-economic power 
China’s near-exponential growth in economic terms, from the beginning of the 
1990s until the present, is an undisputable fact. It is also true that the US economy, 
throughout the same period of time, was much less explosive, albeit its positive 
performance in general. With a 10,2% average increase of its gross domestic 
product (GDP) annually over the past two decades, China has enjoyed a growth 
rate more than four times higher than that of the US, with 2,5% (see Annex III). 
If it is assumed that these trends could be prolonged long enough, parity would 
                                               
24 It must be noted that there is some arbitrariness in my selection of indicators, which I believe are the 
most representative of each power component, and only partly reflect those of the SBS index. More 
specifically: [total population] instead of [total population] and [population in cities with a population 
over 20,000] for demographic power; [total GDP] instead of [energy consumption] for industrial-economic 
power; and [military expenditure] instead of [military expenditure] and [standing army] for military power. 
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be around the corner. This is impressive given the enormous initial gap between 
the two economies: using 1990 again as the base for comparison, China’s GDP 
represented just above one-twentieth (6,3%) of the US; twenty years later, there 
is still a long path to trail, but the disparity is now less than one-fourth (27,8%). 
Employing the average of the annual percentage GDP increase for the past 20 
years, and the 2010 GDP figures for extrapolation, China’s economy will be level 
with that of the US in 2023. Furthermore, according to PTT criteria, China can be 
defined as a ‘challenger’ as early as 2020, when it acquires 80% of the dominant 
state’s power (see Annex IV).25 
4.1.3 Military power 
For the past twenty years there has been a mismatch between what would be 
expected from a defying China and its investment in the military. Its expenditure, 
representing in 1990 an extremely modest 3,4% of what the US spent, has suffered 
a ten-fold increase until 2010, but the disproportion, under one-fifth (16,7%), is 
still overwhelming. The GDP gap between China and the US could account for these 
absolute figures; however, a strategic option for economic consolidation – rather 
than military strengthening – becomes clear considering the China’s share of the 
GDP directed at the military budget (an average of 2,0% against US’ 3,9% for the 
past two decades). In short, it spends ‘less of less’, while the US invests ‘more of 
more’ (see Annexes VI and VII). According to the Pentagon, “the PLA [People’s 
Liberation Army] is on track to achieve its goal of building a modern, regionally-
focused military by 2020” (US Department of Defence, 2010b), which admittedly 
falls short of what is required for a de facto US-China power transition. 
                                               
25 The GDP 2010-2030 projections were based on current US $. If, instead, constant 2000 US $ had been 
used, China would become a challenger in 2025 and would reach exact parity in 2028 (see Annex V). It is 
very hard to elaborate projections on China’s GDP, as the calculations are not standardised to account for 
purchasing power parity and exchange rate calculations (on this difficulty, see Weede, 2003). Consequently, 
this exercise is only bound to demonstrate a generic trend. 
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If, again, we use the past twenty years’ average figures as the groundwork for 
future projections, a tentative US-China crossover point in this particular element 
of power (measured as military budget) can be calculated. Assuming that the US 
invests roughly two times as much, but at the same time taking into account its 
approximately four times smaller growth rate compared to China, exact parity 
will occur in 2032, nine years after the economic-industrial crossover point. 
 Figure 4.1  China’s projected evolution for three power components compared to the US as denominator 
 
In the figure above, a forecast for the next few decades, based on 1990-2010 
trends, translates the power shift graphically for each of the three dimensions of 
power (no crossover point in demographic power; crossovers in 2023 and 2032 
in GDP and military expenditure, respectively). In this synthesis, both the US and 
China’s growth curves are accounted for, the US’ figures representing the base line 
that allows comparing for relative shares of power. 
4.1.4 ‘Hard power’ and the Composite Index of National Capability 
If, on the one hand the suitability, cross-time comparability and forecasting 
on the above indicators is questionable, on the other hand, the widely-used CINC 
appears to be even more problematic. Although it is universally acknowledged 
that a power transition has not yet occurred, this index shows that it has already 
happened, with China formally a ‘contender’ at the ‘central system’ in 1992 and 
overtaking the US in 1996 (see Annex VIII and Figure 4.5 (p. 40)). In Figure 4.2, 
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the indicators (all six are ascribed the same weight) are divided into three groups 
of two – representing the economic, military and demographic power dimensions. 
We can clearly see that, for the past twenty years, China’s huge lead in terms of 
total population against the US has decreased only very faintly, while its total 
urban population has nearly closed the gap; its iron and steel production has 
soared over the past decade, while catching up in terms of energy consumption; 
finally, China’s military personnel has remained relatively stable at a 2:1 ratio, 
which contrasts with the enormous mismatch in terms of military spending. 
Figure 4.2  China’s 1990-2007 score for each CINC indicator compared to the US as denominator 
 
Key: (TPOP) Total population (IRST) Iron and steel production (MILPER) Military personnel 
 (UPOP) Urban population (Energy) Energy consumption (MILEX) Military expenditure 
  
4.2 Liberal-institutionalist theory 
LIT does not ignore the role of the above dimensions of power in identifying 
shifts. However, a more comprehensive analysis requires tackling them from a 
different angle, together with the study of other elements. Is China, apparently 
destined to overtake the US as the world’s leading economy in a matter of years, 
equipped with what it takes to displace the US as the international system’s leading 
power? First, I will compare the results for each country of indicators which aim 
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to cover values, culture, and policies, identified by Nye as ‘soft power’ resources. 
Then, I will compare economic performance and future potential with variables 
that provide a more qualitative, fine-grained portrait of the two countries. Finally, 
I will introduce international institutions as vehicles where influence is yielded 
and the degree of involvement in them is equated with power. This will lead to a 
comparison of the ranking of the US and China in two indexes (CINC and SNPI) 
located at two opposite poles regarding conceptions of power. To conclude, the 
compatibility between the results for each power index and how they fit empirical 
observations will be discussed. 
4.2.1 Cultural attraction and popularity 
Chan (2008: 16) suggests that cultural attraction (identified by Nye as one of 
the ‘soft power’ resources) can be measured by the influx of foreign students and 
tourists. The number of foreigners enrolled in Chinese educational institutions 
has increased over time, but there is still a considerable discrepancy in relation to 
the US, the world’s premier destination. In terms of international visitors, even 
though its favourable geographical position (many bordering countries) should 
be discounted for, China has managed to close the gap in a matter of a decade (see 
Annexes IX and X). Regarding film and music dissemination, indicators proposed 
by Nye (2004), we can maintain that US global primacy is not threatened – let 
alone by China. Despite the confrontationist posture that American superpower 
status triggers to a greater or lesser degree, its power of attraction has not suffered 
from it. As noted by Josef Joffe, unlike the culture of past empires, that of the US 
does not stop at its military borders due to its universalistic nature (quoted in Nye 
2004: 11). China is still far from being able to compete at this level. 
In the opposite direction, polls conducted worldwide show that, for the first 
time, a majority believes that the US has already been or will be overtaken by 
China as the world’s dominant power, a view that nearly half of the American 
respondents share too (PRC 2011: 14-15). China’s perceived rise is accompanied 
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by rather favourable opinions across the world – including Western countries and, 
perhaps surprisingly, Americans themselves – in contrast with the quite polarised 
opinions expressed on the US – positive in the Western countries; very negative 
in most Muslim countries; and a rough fifty-fifty split among Chinese respondents 
(ibid: 21, 37).26 Although the rise of China is generally welcomed in economic 
terms, its eventual growth in military power is seen with reservation (ibid, 39). 
These results could suggest that despite loud criticism on US recent actions (most 
notably the 2003 intervention in Iraq), the surges of unpopularity are not strong 
enough for the public opinion to applaud alterations in the current unbalanced 
distribution of military power. Distrust on a rising China in this field (a feeling 
that its own political elites discern) may well be a factor preventing, or at least 
postponing, a serious challenge to the status quo. 
4.2.2 Technology and human capital 
A selection of indicators of technological attributes used by Kevin Sweeney’s 
index combining ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power (Chan 2005: 694) shows that China shows 
signs of improvement, but is still very far from assuming a leading position. The 
US, as the main driver of the Information Revolution, has a substantial advantage 
in terms of access to the internet and cellular phones, and China’s fast growth 
must be put in perspective given its low starting base. Its figures for scientific and 
technical journal articles shows progress for the past two decades, but are still 
one-fourth of the US’. Finally, an area where China has excelled is in the number 
of patent applications: with a ratio of 1:10 relative to the US in 1991, in 2009 the 
Americans were overtaken in this indicator (see Annexes XI to XIV). 
Finally, despite China’s enormous inequalities, it shows signs of heading away 
from patterns typical of the less developed countries. Its literacy rate increased 
from 78% in 1990 to 94% in 2009 (World Bank, 2011), its life expectancy rate 
                                               
26 The results for this question were divided into favourable (“very favourable” and “somewhat favourable” 
answers) and unfavourable (“somewhat unfavourable” and “very unfavourable” answers). For the sample 
design and full results of the enquiries, see pp. 67-158. 
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has also risen at a firm pace, and its infant mortality rate has dropped dramatically 
over the past two decades (see Annexes XV and XVI). The Chinese improvements 
uncover a qualitative leap, which can also be detected in its GDP per capita, which 
has increased an average of 12% for the past thirty years. On the other hand, the 
disparity vis-à-vis the US is still huge (over six times lower). In face of the current 
situation, not even the most optimistic of projections could suggest that China has 
any possibility of closing the gap in the foreseeable future (see Annex XVII), as 
even if current growth trends for both powers remained constant, China would 
only equal the US in per capita income by the end of the century (Nye 2008: 57). 
4.2.3 Institutions and international involvement 
Throughout great part of the 1990s, China adopted a confrontational attitude 
which fuelled hostility from its Asian neighbours and the US, having shifted in the 
turn of the century to a new strategy that focused on bilateral relations and more 
multilateralism (Goldstein, 2003). Figure 4.3 shows how China’s membership in 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) has risen and will seemingly ‘normalise’ 
in relation to the US. Although it is underachieving when compared to Japan and 
Russia (Chan 2008: 24), China’s trajectory remains impressive if its past isolation 
is taken into account (for instance, it only joined the United Nations in 1971). 
A measure where the US boasts an absolute advantage is in number of troops 
deployed abroad: China does not have any, while in 2011 approximately 25% of 
American military personnel (around 400,000 men and women) was participating 
actively overseas (US Department of Defence, 2010a). The British allies come next 
in line, but at a great distance, with only one-tenth of the US figure, followed by 
France (Chan 2005: 23, data from 2005). An analysis of the last century’s historical 
background helps to understand these numbers, but China’s current inability (or 
lack of interest) to play an active role in this field beyond its immediate borders is 
not in tune with a power aspiring to top US dominance. Equally revealing is the 
American global network of security commitments compared to China’s single 
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defence pact with North Korea (ibid). These indicators suggest that US power, as 
understood by Lake in terms of authority, is still high, and that China does not 
show signs of being able to build up the necessary legitimacy to take its place as 
the provider of social order. 
Figure 4.3  US and China IGO membership in absolute numbers; China compared to the US as denominator27 
 
4.2.4 Network power and the Structural Network Power Index 
In social network theory adapted to international relations, power is viewed 
in relational terms, rather than in isolation from the system’s structure. States that 
are centrally positioned within a network are more powerful due to their “greater 
access to and possible control over the relevant resources” (Kim 2010: 406), thus 
more able to get others to do what they want; on the other hand, power based on 
attributes does not capture the relational aspect. 
Centrality is defined in several dimensions: ‘degree centrality’ reveals states’ 
visibility and ability to engage in third-party duties due to the many ties to other 
                                               
27 COW (2007). Note that although I use the US as the base for comparison, in this particular ranking there 
are European countries which score higher (e.g. France, Germany and the UK), owing to their immersion 
in a dense institutional web. At the same time, one must be cautious of the various biases when using this 
kind of data for a US-China comparison: Asia, as a whole, is still under-institutionalised (Friedberg 1993: 
22-24) despite the potential offered by China’s many neighbouring countries, a ‘geographical advantage’ 
which is not available to the rather isolated US. 
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states; ‘betweenness centrality’, which analyses minimal length paths to the other 
units in the network, is an indicator of potential for control (communication, for 
instance); ‘flow-betweenness centrality’ shows to what extent states can directly 
or indirectly affect communication channels (assuming that interactions do not 
always happen through the shortest path); ‘core centrality’ measures power as a 
core-periphery continuum, the states closer to the core being the stronger ones; 
finally, ‘ego network brokerage centrality’ ranks the ability of states as transaction 
facilitators through brokerage (ibid, 408 ff.).28 
From 1960 to 2000, the US has led all of the components above undisputed, 
with an overwhelming presence of Western countries in the top five lists (the 
Soviet Union being the only exception, with four appearances out of a possible 
twenty-five). China has a modest record, never making the top fifteen in ‘degree’, 
‘coreness’ and ‘ego network brokerage’, however making occasional appearances  
in ‘betweenness’ and ‘flow-betweenness’ centralities (see Annexes XVIII to XXII). 
The SNPI model is assembled through a combination of indicators reflecting 
six types of international interactions, which all conform, in one way or another, 
to LIT’s conception of power. The general picture of the ranking produced is very 
close to each of the kinds of ‘centrality’ considered. Below, we can see that China 
scores poorly – 24th in 1970 and 2000; below 30th in the other years. 
Table 4.1  1960-2000 SNPI top five ranking (and China)29 
Pos. 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
1 US (0.428) US (0.370) US (0.410) US (0.403) US (0.393) 
2 UK (0.321) UK (0.345) France (0.337) France (0.340) France (0.327) 
3 France (0.315) France (0.333) UK (0.332) UK (0.322) UK (0.323) 
4 Italy (0.251) Italy (0.271) Italy (0.280) Italy (0.287) Italy (0.289) 
5 FRG (0.240) FRG (0.247) Japan (0.250) Canada (0.275) Canada (0.288) 
...           
24 (below 30th pos.) China (0.090) (below 30th pos.) (below 30th pos.) China (0.128) 
 
                                               
28 Kim’s SNPI framework is heavily influenced by the theoretical contribution of Hafner-Burton, Kahler 
and Montgomery (2009) (see pp. 21-22 above). 
29 Adapted from Kim (2009: 9). 
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Unfortunately, there is data available only until the year 2000. Looking at the 
different ‘centrality’ scores and the SNPI ranking, there is no noteworthy increase 
in China’s power since 1990 (in fact, the results, especially in the top part of the 
table, do not vary much over the fifty-year span). Bearing in mind that this model 
measures communication patterns and resource flows (Kim 2009: 1), China’s 
increase in IGO membership (the next of kin indicator) is not strengthened by the 
structural network power results (cf. Figure 4.3 and Table 4.1). Therefore, when 
conceiving power in this light, no evidence points at the imminence of a power 
transition. 
4.3 Discussion 
As the above analysis shows, the two different approaches to power generate 
rankings that diverge greatly. What exactly causes some countries to be under or 
overrated under the CINC and SNPI models is the weight each gives to particular 
indicators of power. Given the different scores for both indexes, at least one of 
them is not suitable for measuring power. I will now show where the divergent 
results originate from, identify shortcomings in each of the indexes, and suggest 
which kind of indicators are the most appropriate in measuring power in the 
current context. 
4.3.1 Diverging foci: population and integration 
In Table 4.2, under the CINC column we can identify a group of states with 
high scores in raw capability indicators which one would otherwise not visualise 
as powerful, or that powerful.30 In what could be justly criticised as a ‘power as 
population’ approach, having a large population is apparently a key requirement 
to make it to the top of the ranking, as only four of the thirty most populated 
                                               
30 India’s position is clearly inflated by its huge population; the same applies to states such as Bangladesh 
and Myanmar. In Europe, the same factor contributes to Poland and Ukraine’s higher ranking compared to 
stronger economies and more influential powers (such as the Netherlands) due to their small population. 
On the other hand, North Korea’s power is exaggerated by its enormous standing army. 
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countries in the world do not appear in the CINC’s top thirty list. In the US-China 
contest in particular, China’s lead results from the combination of its massive 
population, which in turn potentiates high scores in other indicators directly 
dependent on it: urban population, industrial output and number of troops. In 
sum, the CINC’s assessment of the basis of power resides in the raw capabilities 
of states, with population sizes shaping decisively the ranking. 
Table 4.2  Top thirty powers according to the latest CINC and SNPI scores 
Pos. CINC (2007) SNPI (2000)  Pos. CINC (2007) SNPI (2000) 
1 China US  16 North Korea Denmark 
2 US France  17 Mexico Norway 
3 India UK  18 Ukraine Finland 
4 Japan Italy  19 Spain Israel 
5 Russia Canada  20 Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia 
6 Brazil Spain  21 Egypt Portugal 
7 Germany Netherlands  22 Canada Poland 
8 South Korea Switzerland  23 Bangladesh South Africa 
9 UK Belgium  24 Taiwan China 
10 France Sweden  25 Thailand South Korea 
11 Italy Japan  26 Nigeria Ireland 
12 Turkey Australia  27 Vietnam Argentina 
13 Pakistan Austria  28 Australia Belarus 
14 Indonesia Russia  29 Poland Cyprus 
15 Iran Germany  30 Myanmar New Zealand 
 Alternatively, the SNPI model reflects fundamental differences of conceptions 
of power, and the results diverge accordingly. In Figure 4.4 a very weak correlation 
between the two rankings can be visualised. The focus on ‘power as relations’ (as 
opposed to being centred on resources) calls for indicators which cover cultural 
attraction and international involvement. Elements of ‘hard power’ are addressed 
very superficially; instead, centrality within networks, capturing the ability to 
control communications and resources, generates a classification which is a 
reversal, in many cases, of the first index.31 Here too we can identify a bias, this 
time favouring the traditionally integrated ‘Western world’: only four to six states, 
depending on the criteria used, do not belong to this political-economic space. In 
                                               
31 India, Russia and Brazil (third, fifth and sixth respectively when measured by hard power criteria) do 
not even make it into the SNPI top thirty list. Conversely, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium and 
Sweden, strong in network power, score very low in the CINC model. 
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fact, there is a close overlap in the membership of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the appearance in the SNPI’s top thirty table. 
Concerning the US and China head-to-head, China (the CINC’s number one) scores 
poorly by the standards of network analysis, while the US is firmly rooted (and 
has been, for at least the past sixty years) in the lead. This is unsurprising and 
reflects America’s predominance over the shaping of the international order, its 
institutions and regimes. 
Figure 4.4  Spearman Rank-Order Correlation for CINC (2007) and SNPI (2000) rankings 
 
4.3.2 China’s power and the limitations of the quantitative approach 
Figure 4.5 shows graphically the extent to which the CINC scores deviate from 
the consensual view that the US is still clearly the world’s most powerful nation.32 
China today may be closer to reaching parity, but that event is still far from taking 
place – let alone in the mid-nineties, as the CINC’s data suggests. Hence, we can 
confidently state that power conceived predominantly in terms of raw capabilities 
                                               
32 For the recognition of American military superiority from a Chinese General, see Kahn (2005); for some 
high-ranked government officials’ statements on the economic power gap, see Chen (2009: 13-15). 
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creates a significant discrepancy in the depiction of the distribution of power. 
Concurrently, although the criticism of the quantitative approach partially implies 
an inclination towards the alternative style, it is also clear that the indicators 
shaping the SNPI also produce distortions.   
Where do ‘hard power’ indicators in general, and the CINC in particular, fail? 
Levy (2008: 19-20) points out that PTT’s perception of power, whose proposed 
indicators suit the particularities of the industrial era (19th and 20th centuries), 
overlooks technology’s decisive impact on power transitions. Because this affects 
directly both economic performance and military power, we must take into 
consideration the location of innovation.33 Levy does not expect China to reach 
world economic leadership due to its fairly closed political system; in contrast, 
the US’ liberal character, based in openness and competitiveness, provides the 
optimal conditions for innovation. 
Figure 4.5  China’s CINC (v.4) score compared to the US as denominator34  
 
                                               
33 Historically, the different phases of the Industrial Revolution have corresponded to power shifts (starting 
with British leadership, then German, and American at a later stage). More recently, with the Information 
Revolution, US economic dominance was consolidated. On the other hand, powerful rivals unable to 
innovate, such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War, inevitably declined. In terms of military power, 
important landmarks in the last century were, first, the Nuclear Revolution; later, after other great powers 
had acquired that type of technology, the US’ absolute leading position was restored with its revolution 
in military affairs. 
34 The lighter shaded areas cover the periods when China can be considered a ’challenger’ (over 80% of 
the leading state’s aggregate power) and the heavier shaded area when it overtakes the US onwards. 
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Chan (2005) shares Levy’s scepticism on ‘hard power’ indicators as adequate 
measures of power, and uses a similar line of argument for all three elements of 
the CINC. He criticises the weight of the demographic element, which pulls heavily 
populated powers to positions in the ranking where they would otherwise not be 
in. Size is important insomuch as great power status requires a large population, 
but large populations do not necessarily lead to that status. Indicators that assess 
quality of life (such as wealth and education) are crucial in understanding whether 
the demographic power of a state is only latent, or has the potential to develop 
into actual strength. The same criticism can be made about the economic element, 
assessed with measures of industrialisation instead of those reflecting the modern 
economy, founded on information technology and human capital. Finally, carrying 
out a head count of military personnel also overshadows the importance of the 
qualitative aspect in contemporary armed forces (Tellis et al. 2000: 30). In this 
field, American dominance is absolute if measured “in terms of quality, precision, 
mobility, jointness, and effectiveness of war-fighting capabilities” (Al-Rodhan 
2007: 53). In face of the distorted picture caused by the CINC’s conceptualisation 
of power, Chan suggests that in the same way this measure was not able to predict 
the demise of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, it is now most likely overestimating 
the imminence of a US-China power transition (ibid, 691). 
As we have seen, China is ahead of the US – or will be, in the near future – in 
crude indicators of power, such as total population, standing army, consumption, 
and also GDP. If the approach shifts from quantity to quality, and other, more 
subtle, indicators, then the picture is quite different, as examined above.  However, 
besides the CINC’s bias towards ‘large’ powers, there are other reasons for being 
uncertain about the sustainability of China’s growth trajectory. 
In terms of GDP (commonly used as the indicator of power), since 1994 the 
World Bank has estimated China’s economic performance based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP) – i.e. correcting goods’ prices to adjust the exchange rate for 
converting China’s currency into dollars. (The GDP data from the World Bank 
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data sets that I use for the US-China crossover projections reflect PPP.) Wohlforth 
(2007) warns that this new method exaggerates the speed at which the US is 
losing its relative advantage, insisting that parity will happen not in the 2020s but 
in the 2050s. Moreover, high GDP growth rates, such as the past twenty years’ 
10% average used to project the next couple of decades, have never occurred for 
more than certain periods, and China would not be an exception. Eichengreen, 
Park and Shin (2011) predict that its economy will slow down as its GDP per 
capita exceeds a threshold which will be met in roughly five years. 
Closely linked to pessimism on the sustainability of linear growth will be the 
upcoming demographic problem (Singh 2008: 582), with China’s ageing population 
caused by the ‘one child’ policy having a negative economic impact. Politically, the 
paradox of a communist party ruling a capitalist country will have to be addressed 
eventually, a situation that promises instability (Wohlforth 2007: 47). Finally, 
other challenges in a medium-term perspective may slow down the country’s 
rise, such as social unrest triggered by the inequalities between the rural poor 
and urban elites, rampant corruption, and environmental degradation (Morrison 
2009: 20 ff). 
On the CINC and SNPI models in particular, one conclusion can be made with 
the naked eye: none is able to capture each nation’s power in the relevant terms 
for answering the difficult question of if, and when, China will surpass the US. The 
CINC’s biases create an overtaking that is only academic, as a simple observation 
of the US and China’s role in the global order makes clear. On the contrary, the 
mechanics behind the SNPI model turn out to exaggerate the power of middle tier 
powers which are well integrated in the international society. Regarding indexes, 
Sweeney’s ‘hard-soft power’ composite has the merit of not generating scores at 
odds with reality. For instance, it never places the Soviet Union at the top of the 
ranking, unlike the CINC which observes a crossover just a few years before its 
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collapse. Independent of the internal logic behind its figures, the end result is a 
set of fairly realistic assessments.35 
4.3.3 Is China on the rise? 
In a nutshell, China’s growth, according to the PTT conception of power, is real 
and the US is in the imminence of facing a great challenge ahead; LIT recommends 
not jumping into that conclusion so fast, and points out that the US’ strengths, 
which correspond to China’s weaknesses, will allow it to preserve its position for 
a much longer stretch of time. 
Having this in mind, we must nonetheless acknowledge that China comfortably 
exceeds the necessary conditions for becoming a superpower (large population, 
high economic output), and simply depends on improving qualitatively in other 
aspects. China has performed well in a variety of indicators valued by liberal-
institutionalists in the recent past, but needs to improve on others. Thus, catching 
up with the US is set to happen in the longer run, and the exact point at which the 
crossover point occurs will depend on the extent to which China is able to 
innovate and modernise in the economic and military fields respectively, and how 
well the regime manages the overcome the series of internal challenges which it 
cannot escape from. 
  
                                               
35 In 1995 (unfortunately the last year with data), the top ten countries were, in order: US (0.293), China 
(0.148), Japan (0.107), Russia (0.080), France (0.076), India (0.076), Germany (0.072), Britain (0.063), 
Italy (0.042), and Brazil (0.039). The reasonableness of the results of this index does not, of course, imply 
automatically that the suitability of, and weight given to, each indicator is ‘correct’. However, this particular 
construction does offer a more convincing ordering of the world’s most powerful nations at each period 
than the other two indexes. 
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5. China’s rise and hegemonic war 
The end of the Cold War brought an end to decades of a tense two-horse race, 
resulting in Russia losing its superpower status and the US perceived thereafter 
as a ‘hyperpower’. Despite America’s preponderance over all the other states of 
the international system, due to its growth trajectory China was identified from 
an early stage an emerging power which could, in a more or less distant future, 
compete with the US (for some scholarly examples, see Christensen 2001: fn. 1). 
In the last chapter I made the point that China is closing the gap, notwithstanding 
the important obstacles and uncertainties it faces. In the following pages, I will 
start by contrasting the hypotheses presented by PTT and LIT on the implications 
of China’s rise, whose views differ critically on the potential for hegemonic war. 
Assessing the risk of a Sino-American conflict requires an attempt to pinpoint 
where China lies in the satisfaction-dissatisfaction continuum, the key variable. 
Then, I will analyse China’s behaviour during the past two decades in order to 
determine whether its relations with the hegemon and the international order it 
leads are closer to what is expected by power transition, or institutionalist, theory. 
5.1 Contrasting expectations: Organski and Kugler versus Ikenberry 
Since its original formulation, the research programme of PTT has developed 
in several directions (see DiCicco and Levy, 1999). At this point I will not consider 
its refinements and alternative propositions, but will instead restrict myself to the 
expectations drawn from Organski and Kugler’s original framework applied to the 
US-China case. On the other side, the broader field of LIT will be represented by 
Ikenberry’s contributions to the study of order, which I believe are consistent with 
the theory’s view on the announced power transition.36 
                                               
36 Nonetheless, we must not lose sight that there are many other plausible hypotheses on the character 
of US-China relations and this selection portrays only two diametrically opposed ‘ideal types’. For a  
thorough survey of defensible positions, including pessimist liberals and optimist realists, see Friedberg 
(2005). 
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5.1.1 Power transition theory and the critical danger of crossover  
PTT diverges from balance of power theory regarding the best conditions for 
peace to be preserved and the mechanisms behind the redistribution of power. 
First, according to Organski and Kugler, stability is greater when an unbalance of 
power at the top level of the hierarchy of states is present (1980: 19). Secondly, 
PTT downplays the importance of alliance formation (an element which has been 
introduced in the refinements of PTT); instead, it is the combination of socio-
economic and political development (quantified as GNP and the ability to collect 
taxes) which is behind the redistribution of power (ibid, 24-27). 
From these two elements, we can infer that the US’ relative decline, as a result 
of the differential in US-China growth rates, necessarily increases the risk of 
conflict, and that China’s rising trajectory depends more on its internal efforts 
rather than its interactions with the outside world. If we assume that the legitimacy 
of the Chinese Communist Party is dependent on the continuation of economic 
development, and that China’s high “socio-economic” and “political development” 
(as defined by PTT) results from the regime’s control over the state, its population 
and resources, there is a high probability that this self-sustaining relationship will 
endure. So, as development feeds legitimacy and vice-versa, the first determinant 
for a greater likelihood of conflict – China’s relative growth vis-à-vis the hegemon 
– can be regarded as probable. 
The second variable – the degree of satisfaction with the international order – 
is decisive, but harder to assess. PTT assumes that China’s dissatisfaction will 
increase as it approaches the hegemon (ibid, 19-20). According to the mechanics 
of the model, China will seek to secure a place in international society which 
matches the actual distribution of power, while the US will not be willing to share 
the advantages provided by the rules governing the international system that it 
itself crafted. This expectation is based on the assumption that hegemons build 
orders whose rules provide them with substantial advantages over the others and 
that rising powers are ostracised, leading to grievances. Therefore, it follows that 
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China’s recognition as the top dog requires a reshaping of the world order, only 
possible if the US is toppled. 
5.1.2 Institutionalism and the exceptional character of the Western order 
Hegemonic transitions, according to Ikenberry, must not be assumed to unfold 
in the same way. The “nature of the rising state’s regime”, and most importantly 
“the character of the international order itself”, helps us understand why the rising 
state will choose to challenge or accept the rules of the game (2008: 27). In other 
words, when institutional arrangements are erected in such a way that they allow 
newcomers to be accommodated, those nations will have an incentive to integrate 
and become more satisfied with an order that favours their rising trajectory. 
This may well be the case of the transition between the US and China by virtue 
of the post-World War II order, seen as “historically unique” (ibid, 28). Ikenberry 
points out that the leading states of the last three post-war settlements (1815, 
1919, and 1945) have increasingly resorted to institutionalism, pulling together 
orders that were favourable to their interests but also durable. In order to achieve 
this, the hegemon’s power is self-restrained (2001: 4)37. The density of the present 
institutional web in particular was further fuelled by the democratic states that 
were part of it, making it more difficult for an alternative order to replace the 
existing one (ibid, 5). The end of bipolarity did not affect the structure of the 
international order, but rather reinforced it with the adherence of Russia and the 
former communist countries, becoming thereafter truly global in scope. The post-
1945 order provides today “conditions for rising states to advance their expanding 
economic and political goals within it” (Ikenberry 2008: 29).38 
                                               
37 For a more detailed analysis of the characteristics (and shortcomings) of the 1815 and 1919 settlements 
compared to the special features of the 1945 order, see Ikenberry (2001: Chs. 4-6). 
38 For example, within institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and the World Bank, states’ influence increases or decreases according to economic shares. The 
conversion of perceived power position and say, voting power, may not be linear – yet, there is flexibility 
in these IGOs to accommodate a rising state, as China’s entry, and then growing influence, demonstrates. 
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In a highly interdependent world in the economic and security realms, China 
has a strong incentive to reassure others of its benign intentions as it increases its 
power (Ikenberry 2011: 65-66). In the recent past, aggressive policies have been 
counterproductive, causing regional instability and drawing neighbours closer to 
the US; hence, revisionist attitudes that reject multilateralism do not serve China’s 
economic development, its near cross-border relations, and the crucial connection 
to the advanced, Western economies. In short, the continuation of China’s upward 
growth trajectory is dependent on a status quo posture, as growth and stability 
are intrinsically intertwined (Liu, 2006). That said, why would China challenge 
this non-discriminatory order based on the openness of markets which it has 
benefited tremendously from? A hypothetical attempt to redraft the rules of the 
game would anyhow be highly problematic, as it would meet the opposition of 
not only the US but the whole liberal, democratic world (an aspect that PTT 
overlooks by not paying enough attention to alliance formation). Secondly, it 
would be unrealistic to picture China forcefully trying to impose an alternative 
order, as in the nuclear age “war-driven change has been abolished as a historical 
process” (Ikenberry 2008: 31). In fact, even a ‘new Cold War’ based in some sort 
of economic warfare would have devastating effects on both sides, given China’s 
connectedness to the global economy and to the US – as is the case of the nuclear 
dimension, economically the two powers are in a “mutually assured destructive 
relationship” (Art 2010: 364). 
The hypotheses derived from each of the frameworks diverge greatly.39 On one 
side, Organski and Kugler and their ‘one size fits all’ approach to power transitions 
point to the gloomy prospect of deep instability as China relies only on itself to 
overtake the US and redraft the rules of the game, coercively or not. On the other 
side, Ikenberry draws attention to the exceptionality of the present order, with 
                                               
39 Both approaches provide important insights but also have shortcomings. For instance, Organski and 
Kugler’s treatment of the dominant state as automatically having an interest in preserving the existing 
order suggests, at least implicitly, that the rising power is endemically revisionist. On the other hand, 
Ikenberry’s optimism, rooted in deep economic interdependence, underestimates to a certain degree the 
potential for instability caused by the dominant and challenger regimes’ disparate character. 
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China as a major beneficiary. Hence, as there is no apparent reason to challenge 
the US-led order (a source of prosperity), and doing so would entail unacceptable 
risks (nuclear deterrence), China is expected to keep navigating within, rather 
than outside, the system. 
5.2 Is China a status quo or a revisionist power? 
There is still no consensus on how to assess states’ satisfaction with scientific 
precision.40 I will not try to shorten the knowledge gap of that under-theorised 
term (for a survey of past attempts to define ‘status quo’, see Johnston, 2003), 
rather I will analyse China’s position through a more general lens, based on its  
attitudes towards the prevailing institutions and rules of conduct in international 
relations. Therefore, a status quo oriented China will not seek to replace the rules 
of the game, abiding to the ordering principles of “the legitimacy of [its] ruling 
elites, the rules of warfare, the mechanisms for making territorial adjustments, 
and the mutual observance of spheres of influence” (Chan 2008: 29). 
Signs of whether China is satisfied or dissatisfied can be detected, for example, 
in its IGO participation (particularly its actions in the United Nations Organisation, 
and its Security Council) and ratification of international agreements (ibid, 32-
35). In the previous section I demonstrated how China has undergone a steady 
‘normalisation’ process in terms of IGO participation in relation to the US (see 
Figure 4.3), an observation which can be extended to the other great powers. 
Regarding the ratification of international treaties, that indicator too reveals that 
China is in tune with its peers (I will return to this measure with more detail on 
the final section). Yet, the best barometer is the general atmosphere between 
Beijing and Washington, shaped by the regime’s stance on a number of important 
                                               
40 For example, Kang and Gibler (2012) cross-test the most widely used indicators of satisfaction, such as 
‘alliance formation’, ‘military build-ups’ and ‘status inconsistency’ (e.g. a state whose military power does 
not match its prestige) with the ‘cost of money for borrowers’ – only to find out that their ability to predict 
conflict is limited and are weakly correlated among each other. 
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issue-areas valued by both sides – this atmosphere shifts between the darker and 
lighter shades of pure conflict and pure cooperation.41 
The analysis that follows is based in rational choice reasoning, the point of 
departure being the behaviour (China’s actions) that is observed in a given context, 
or in relation to a certain issue (the environment), which inform of its goals (the 
preferences). Verifying whether China has a revisionist agenda or is a status quo 
state is an inductive process that inverts the direction arrows of the preferences-
environment-action triangle. However, this approach is not free of pitfalls, as for 
more than one motive can coexist at one time in shaping outcomes, and the causal 
nexus presented may not even be the strongest drive in action. 
5.2.1 The mid-1990s strategic twist: from assertiveness to cooperation 
As I have shown in the last chapter, over the past two decades China has 
improved immensely in a wide range of power indicators, both in absolute terms 
and relative to the system’s leading power. Has this process generated increasing 
tensions among the two powers as PTT would expect? To find an answer to this 
question in the challenger’s perspective, and given that it is still far from global 
domination, it is more reasonable to assess the US-China clash at the regional level: 
in Mearsheimer’s terms, China’s pursuit of regional hegemony against America’s 
offshore balancing strategy to prevent it (2001: 40-42). If we assume that the 
power gap has been closing at a constant rate, we should expect tensions to 
heighten accordingly. 
With the end of the Cold War, although China no longer regarded the US as a 
military threat, its spreading influence in the region, as a result of the breakdown 
of the Soviet empire, constituted a serious risk in terms of its regime security. This 
‘democratic threat’, amplified by the Tiananmen demonstrations, but which also 
                                               
41 It is however important to stress that the analysis should not confuse revisionism with the legitimate 
aspirations of an increasingly powerful nation attempting to acquire the share of influence that it believes 
matches its new power position within the international system. 
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had a strong impact in Taiwan (one of China’s vital national interests) led China, 
whose self-confidence was boosted by its rapid growth, to pursue an assertive 
foreign policy. In relation to territorial claims in the South China Sea and the status 
of Taiwan, this strategy produced not only fears in the neighbouring states but 
also US apprehension concerning its interests in the region. Though more powerful 
economic and militarily in the mid-1990s, China’s strategy jeopardised its own 
security and further growth, as its leaders sensed the dangers of the combination 
of America’s post-Cold War unprecedented capabilities and the belief that their 
own national security frontiers knew no borders (Goldstein 2003: 67). 
Confronted with this paradox and the growing antagonism of the regional 
powers (especially Japan) which moved closer to the US to resist China’s rise, the 
strategy adopted, described as neo-Bismarckian, reveals a sharp perception of the 
benefits that China could extract from multilateralism, decreasing the risk of 
isolation and, at the same time, advancing its national interests.42 Hence, a series 
of ‘strategic partnerships’ became China’s trademark in its bilateral relations with 
the other great powers, including the hegemon. In spite of tensions such as its 
human rights’ record or the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, there 
was no viable alternative but to foster a constructive relation with the US in order 
to secure the necessary conditions for continued modernisation. China’s strategy, 
in Goldstein’s words, of integrating “available means with preferred ends” (ibid, 
83) is thus quite stable. Unlike Bismarck’s system of alliances, whose rigidness 
and complexity eventually resulted in an all-out war, in this case not only the 
nuclear deterrent but also China’s military backwardness vis-à-vis the US suggests 
that the probability of such an outcome is low, as restraint serves China’s interests 
best during its ascendant trajectory. 
                                               
42 Goldstein identifies three possible strategic alternatives which were not practicable: internal balancing 
(increasing military capabilities would lead to further isolation); discrediting the ‘China threat’ perception 
(this attempt did not match the regime’s assertiveness and did not restore its neighbours’ confidence); 
and securing allies (this option would put in risk China’s integration in the Western order which fuelled its 
impressive economic growth, in addition to the prohibitive cost of challenging the US and its partners in 
the region) (ibid, 71). 
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5.2.2 The regional issues and China’s military: are ambitions still limited? 
After a period of a more assertive foreign policy which alarmed its neighbours 
and the US, the Chinese regime realised that the opportunity cost of that strategy 
was too high and acknowledged the benefits of becoming a “responsible nation”, 
so long as the other powers welcomed its integration efforts into the international 
economic and political mechanisms (Liping, 2001). In an examination of what are 
considered the three main critical cases in East Asia – China’s territorial disputes 
in the South China Sea; the management of the troublesome Korean peninsula; 
and the status of Taiwan – Goldstein (2007) concludes that the evidence indicates 
that the first two reveal a prudent China that shifted from a policy consistent with 
PTT to institutionalised multilateralism. In the case of the disputed islands, after 
initially showing resolve, China apparently recognised that cooperative solutions, 
forged in the emerging Asian institutions, would best serve its interests. The 
Korean case evolved in the same direction: seen at first as an opportunity to 
challenge American influence in the region, the circumstances changed as the 
economic ties with South Korea deepened and the region was no longer regarded 
as a zero-sum game, rather a venue where both the challenger and the hegemon 
had shared interests.43 
On the other hand, the case of Taiwan, which symbolises the preservation of 
the US’ prevailing position in Asia even as China rises, has not evolved in the same 
direction as the other two – understandably, as it ranks highest in the hierarchy 
of the regime’s priorities. Besides the question of prestige, the problem is framed 
as a matter of state sovereignty and even regime security (He and Feng, 2009). 
Although the economies in both sides are increasingly interdependent, China’s 
hypersensitivity towards Taiwan’s political options has led to a focus on relative, 
rather than absolute gains, with modest institutionalised cooperation (Goldstein 
2007: 670). Concurrently, Taiwan’s perception that the window of opportunity 
                                               
43 It is possible that the shift in behaviour in these two cases reflects China’s strategy of buying time, given 
that it is not yet in a position to force its will; in any case, as the author notes, even if its actions do not 
reveal its preferences, the present policy is consistent with institutionalist theory. 
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for attempting the ultimate aim of formal independence is closing as China 
becomes more powerful, together with the uncertainty as to whether the US 
would not abandon its ally in the worst case scenario of a Chinese military 
intervention, makes the cross-strait venue the one with the highest risk of a direct 
Sino-American confrontation. Given the challenger’s growth trajectory (and its 
perception that time is on its side) and the hegemon’s presumed determination in 
preserving its international reputation if a war between the sides ever breaks out, 
Goldstein believes that PTT better explains the dynamics in course. 
For that matter, the modernisation of China’s army has been regarded as being 
directed primarily at the possibility of a war against Taiwan, and only then comes 
the underlying purpose of deterring the application of American power in East 
Asia (Johnston 2003: 39). Figures of military spending suggest that there is no 
serious internal balancing effort. Externally, one cannot claim that China attempts 
to undermine US alliances in the region, as it is not even clearly against them.44 
There are recent signs, however, that China may be on its way to a more assertive 
position. If we recognise that the US and China cancel each other out in terms of 
nuclear capabilities (the question of each side’s second strike capabilities is only 
secondary), in the next strategic dimension, naval forces, the hegemon’s global 
reach contrasts with the challenger’s traditional weakness. China’s investment in 
its blue-water navy, and the construction of aircraft carriers in progress, has led 
to different interpretations. Some consider that these displays of power just carry 
out a political function: an injection of nationalist pride that consolidates the 
regime’s legitimacy before its people (Chen and Feffer 2009: 65), or that the 
modernisation of China’s military forces is a very basic necessity in line with its 
growing economic power – given its dependency on the external markets, it is 
particularly important to secure its overseas interests (Huang, 2011). 
                                               
44 For instance, the US-South Korea alliance is seen as a stabilising factor in the division of the peninsula that 
benefits all, including China; regarding the US-Japan alliance, the regime is only against its strengthening, 
not its existence, as it serves as a guarantee that Japan’s military power remains constrained (ibid, 40-44). 
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However, China’s naval ambitions also spark worries among US officials, who 
believe that its ‘core interests’ (traditionally associated with the Sino-Taiwanese 
question) are now expanding into areas where the US had never felt challenged 
before, namely its freedom of action from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca 
(Wong, 2010).45 On China’s stiffer attitude, Swaine and Fravel (2010: 15) come to 
the conclusion that although its strategy in dealing with the maritime periphery is 
not likely to change fundamentally in the near to medium term, its rising levels of 
national self-confidence in this specific subject will lead to behaviours that are 
“arguably one of the most important potential causes of serious confrontation or 
even conflict” with the US and its alliance partners over the coming years. 
5.2.3 The liberal democratic order: satisfying or to be weakened? 
As China’s power grows, so should its dissatisfaction with the institutional 
setting, assumed to favour its creator at the same time that it denies newcomers’ 
demands for influence proportional to their growing share of power. But is this 
post-1945 order, as Ikenberry argues, exceptional for allowing rising states to 
fulfil their goals within it? China’s willingness to integrate the global economy and 
its capitalist institutions and the success of its gradual process of absorption 
partly answers this question. In fact, the power of attraction of the international 
financial web of institutions on socialist China represented an important, long-
term victory for the Western order, but does it say anything about the satisfaction 
of this rising power? At a first glance, one would assume that this rapprochement 
reveals China’s status quo orientation. Yet, the circumstances in which it takes 
place opens room for discussion regarding its actual degree of satisfaction. 
                                               
45 Besides the naval issues, the American perception of China’s growing assertiveness rests too on the 
ambiguous selection of issues that the regime has introduced and considered as part of the state’s ‘core 
interests’, which perhaps should not be described in those terms, such as “the US arms sales to Taiwan, 
meetings between foreign leaders and the Dalai Lama, and disputed territories in the South China Sea” 
(Swaine 2010: 6). 
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Notwithstanding the changing behaviour patterns witnessed in the last twenty 
years (confrontational behaviour after the end of the Cold War up until the 1995 
Taiwan crisis; possibly growing assertiveness in the recent past), there has been a 
clear, long-term option pursued by successive Chinese leaderships, starting in the 
late 1970s, of prioritising the country’s economic development, in what was “a 
fundamental break with the autarkic and militaristic model of political survival of 
the past” (Hiim 2010: 50).46 It is therefore reasonable to speculate whether China’s 
apparent satisfaction with the rules of the game is merely a by-product of the 
overarching objectives over the past decades (i.e. becoming a great economic 
power) or if it is genuine. If its satisfaction is only calculative, and given that China 
has already established itself as an economic giant, the cost of destabilising the 
present peaceful setting – without which growth would have not been possible – is 
now lower. In other words, as China’s power grows, so will its interests. The 
expansion of what it considers to be its core interests, mentioned above, may be 
an early signal of restraint giving way to assertiveness. According to this logic, 
cooperative behaviour during an upward trajectory lasts only until after a certain 
amount of power has been accumulated. On the opposite direction, Qin (2003) 
points at the redefinition of China’s national identity (from a revolutionary to a 
status quo power) and the reconstruction of its strategic culture (from conflicting 
to cooperative), suggesting that the efforts to identify with the international society 
and being a responsible and active player within the world system has become 
an enduring feature of that nation.47 
But can China be considered a typical status quo power? It has, in fact, chosen 
to behave as a ‘responsible’ great power externally, but China’s regime still falls 
                                               
46 An analysis of China’s nuclear policies exposes a striking lack of urgency in the modernisation of its 
arsenal. Even as the economy grew, there were successive cuts in the military budget since the end of the 
1970s despite a turbulent security environment. The new approach to security linked political, economic 
and military components. Because the regime’s survival was thought to be directly dependent on economic 
growth, investment in that area was prioritised (ibid, 54; Johnston 2003, 16-17; on China’s concept of 
‘comprehensive national power’, see Ong 2007: 11). 
47 This is especially remarkable because, in the absence of a traumatic event, elements such as ‘national 
identity’ and ‘strategic culture’, though not static, change slowly along time (Gray, 2006), and China was 
arguably not shaken by such an event. 
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short of the Western democratic standards. Although not directly linked to the 
dangers of inversed trajectories at the contender level with regards to hegemonic 
war, its authoritarian nature is looked upon with apprehension by the pessimist 
liberal-institutionalists, which believe that this element will make Sino-American 
relations more prone to clashes. China is still far from subscribing the democratic 
(political) dimension of the Western-led order,48 in spite of the fairly successful 
integration, calculative or not, in its market system component. The accession to 
the WTO, in terms which “far surpassed those made by the founding members” 
(Beeson 2009: 109) exposes its willingness to integrate the global marketplace; in 
return, institutions of this kind welcome the newcomer’s arrival. The fact that they 
consent to being captured from within confirms the US-led order’s openness to 
accommodate China’s rise, a position which is expected to be reciprocated with 
satisfaction and acceptance of the status quo. However, at the same time, China 
has developed what was coined as the ‘Beijing consensus’, an alternative economic 
development model that stands in opposition to the ‘Washington consensus’ (the 
guidelines governing the existing financial institutions). The political, economic, 
and military implications of this model are only vaguely defined, but the hallmark 
of Chinese policy in the international arena is the support for national sovereignty 
irrespective of the characteristic of the regime in power (Williamson 2012: 7). 
This stands in stark contrast to the moral praxis (even if cynical at times) of the 
Western-led world order in its relations with the Third World. 
China, the non-democratic intruder in the liberal order, can thus be seen 
twisting the rules of the game as it consolidates its power position and seeks to 
expand its economic ties. At the same time, it calls for greater multipolarisation 
and criticises what is considered to be the excessive influence of the US in the 
domestic politics of other countries (Legro 2007: 517). Both in the political and 
                                               
48 Presently, China does not challenge that notion of pluralism but acts defensively towards that order 
and the US, cultivating a policy of ‘pretending to be friends’ since the mid-1990s which the Americans 
reciprocate. Throughout the past fifteen years, the various leaders of both countries insist in describing 
US-China relations as cooperative rather than competitive – yet, they cannot at any point be classified as 
‘friendly’ or even ‘favourable’ (Xuetong 2010: 270). 
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economic realms, after a period of steady rise in which divergences with the US 
were strategically muted, an increasingly powerful China is recently beginning to 
reveal a more assertive position towards its peers with the intent of putting into 
practice globalisation on its own terms. Shambaugh (2010) warns that the cycle of 
Chinese restraint is probably over, within the pattern consisting of ‘one step back 
followed by two steps forward’.49 
5.3 Future trends for Sino-American relations 
Finally, what are the future prospects for China’s relation with the US and the 
Western order? Buzan (2010: 18) describes this rising power today as a ‘reformist 
revisionist’ power (rather than a ‘revolutionary’ one) for its resistance and desire 
to reform some of the institutions of international society, even though it accepts 
others for a mixture of calculated and instrumental reasons. He concludes that its 
resistance to the Western ideas of democracy, civil society, human rights and 
environmental issues – considered the “key driver of the normative deepening of 
international society” (ibid) – suggests that we are in the verge of a turning point 
in China’s engagement with international society. China’s greater responsibilities 
as a great power, the effects of the global economic crisis, environmental decay, 
and the erosion of US leadership will have an impact on the rules of the game 
(p. 20) and it is clear that the recipe for peaceful rise, based on a low-profile and 
rather inwards attitude of the last decades, cannot be applied indefinitely. Peaceful 
rise is still possible, but it will be progressively more complicated within an 
international community in which China undertakes a central role, which will 
consequently require a reformulation of its strategy (p. 34). 
                                               
49 The author counts a number of uncompromising attitudes on the behalf of government officials in recent 
times, both at home and abroad, towards the US and beyond, in a wide range of issue-areas: protectionist 
measures against foreign multinationals based in China, military demonstrations, unwillingness to ease 
climate control measures, sweeping arrest of internal dissidents, blocking of sanctions against Iran’s 
nuclear programme, protests and threats against the US and the EU over the hosting of the Dalai Lama, 
and even frictions over economic issues in other regions, ranging from other Asian countries to Australia 
and Latin America. 
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For now, without having taken explicit actions to challenge the status quo, the 
rising power’s signs of antagonism against the hegemon are present, and easily 
inflammable. In a list of seven major issues, Kim (2011) only detects one (North 
Korea’s nuclear ambitions) in which the US and China have shifted from conflict 
to cooperation. In all the other issues, either both conflict and cooperation coexist 
(such as in their economic relations, military and security issues, and the future 
direction of their relations in general), or there is evidence for the predominance of 
conflict (regarding human rights and the Sino-American clash in the Asia-Pacific 
region). Finally, the case of Taiwan is considered one of regulated conflict, where 
the US support for a ‘One-China policy’ and its efforts in improving cross-strait 
relations has contributed to mute a potential conflict. 
In any case, given that the US and China disagree in most of the interests that 
they define as ‘core’, it is hard to envisage their bilateral relations developing in a 
positive direction in the long term, as their differences “cannot be easily resolved 
unless each side agrees to the same international norms when they communicate 
to the world” (ibid, 8). China will reject the universality of international norms, 
interpreted as a means of hampering its rise; on the other hand, the US will oppose 
to China’s stance on sovereignty, perceived as a smokescreen to harm its long run 
interests (ibid). Which norms are the ‘international standard’ is in the eye of the 
beholder, and a rising China which will sooner or later become the world’s most 
powerful nation, feels that time runs on its side. Hence, if in the future a serious 
confrontation does occur, it will most likely be ignited by political-ideological 
clashes around the democratic component of the US-led liberal order. 
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6. Subverting power transition theory: can the hegemon 
become revisionist? 
According to PTT, the potential for a hegemonic war rises when a revisionist 
power overtakes (or is close to overtaking) the dominant nation. The hegemon is 
committed to the preservation of the status quo, which is ultimately ‘its’ creation. 
Logically, the terms ‘hegemon’ and ‘status quo’ stand opposite to ‘challenger’ and 
‘revisionism’. In this section, I will expose some of the arguments that run counter 
to PTT’s original assumptions of the dynamics of the rising and declining great 
powers. 
The hypothesis of a dissatisfied leading state was first introduced by Gilpin, 
who believed that a hegemon would “attempt to change the international system 
if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs” (transcribed from Ikenberry, 
Mastanduno and Kupchan 2009: 12), the international system being defined as the 
rules, institutions, and standards of legitimacy that frame daily interactions (ibid). 
Before the implosion of the Soviet Union, the probability of an American attempt 
to reshape the system was low – because of the mistaken perceptions of its relative 
decline throughout the 1980s the costs of doing so were thought to be too high. 
The subsequent systemic change from bipolarity to unipolarity implied that the 
hypothesis put forward by Gilpin could materialise. US revisionism, however, was 
never seriously considered because that behaviour is generally viewed as typical 
of challenging states. Still, as mentioned earlier in relation to PTT’s alternative 
propositions, it makes perfect sense to ask why a declining hegemon would not 
contemplate waging preventive war against the challenger (and not the opposite) 
before it is too late. This is a particularly logical question given that prospect 
theory foretells that individuals and states are more risk-averse when trying to 
avoid losses than when capitalising on gains, even if the net value of one or the 
other is identical (Levy, 1992). 
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The basic assumption of PTT by which rising powers are anti-status quo, the 
declining hegemon is conservative by nature, and that war is precipitated by the 
increasingly powerful challenger, is explicitly questioned first by Chan, who rests 
his argument both on historical facts of past transitions50 and empirical evidence 
to speculate on the prospects of a US-China conflict. Great power war, as he notes, 
usually originates from local conflicts, ignited as a result of the failure of extended 
deterrence (ibid, 109). In 1914, Austro-Hungary’s intervention following a minor 
incident in Serbia set up the stage for World War I; in 1939, the German invasion 
of Poland sparked World War II. Therefore, if a war between the US and China is 
to occur, it should not start from direct confrontation; instead, it would develop 
from a conflict between a third party and the hegemon or the challenger. In the 
case under study, the strongest candidate in playing the third party role is clearly 
Taiwan. 
In the next two sub-chapters, I will first evaluate the hypothesis of a declining 
US becoming dissatisfied with the order that it itself created, and then make some 
observations on the delicate question of Taiwan. 
6.1 America’s changing priorities and the rules of the game 
Jervis (2006) identifies the September 11 terrorist attacks as the event that 
marked a shift from a “post-Cold War conservative impulse” towards “hegemonic 
revisionism”. Before 2001, George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton’s administrations 
had concentrated on preserving the status quo, in other words, US superiority to 
avoid the emergence of challengers. After that, George W. Bush’s controversial 
belief in the linkage between terrorism and tyranny, and the absence of a peer 
competitor, allowed the US to focus on “remaking the system in its own image” 
                                               
50 Chan challenges the common view that in World War I and World War II Germany was the rising power 
taking advantage of its momentum to strike Britain. Instead, in both cases, although Germany was still 
becoming more powerful in absolute terms, it was already past its peak point and decided to launch a 
preventive war against Russia (then Soviet Union), which was beginning to close the power gap. Hence, 
his claim that it is the nervous, declining state, rather than the rising one, that is inclined to initiate wars 
(ibid, 52-53 ss.). 
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(ibid, 12), which involved actively taming non-democratic regimes, regarded as 
the greatest threat to the security of America and its liberal allies. Jervis’ remarks 
are well-founded, but one can disagree on the “hegemonic revisionism” label. While 
the ‘hegemonic’ element is accurate (the US could only engage itself so extensively 
due to its power supremacy), describing its actions as ‘revisionist’ fails to recognise 
the deep-rooted Wilsonian tradition in American foreign policy.51 Even when it 
twisted or disregarded the rules of the game – as was the case of the 2003 Iraq 
intervention, which objectively violated international law (Anghie, 2009) – the 
underlying principles guiding the US (the promotion of the its liberal-democratic 
order) remained unaltered, in a “merger of liberal moralism and realist method” 
(Bishai 2004: 51). Ultimately, what changed with the 2001 terrorist attacks was 
America’s sense of vulnerability, which led it to redefine priorities. The focus on 
rogue states and asymmetric threats to homeland security pushed the great power 
game to the backburner. In terms of power transitions and Chan’s suggestion of 
aggressive declining nations, there is no evidence, at least during this period, of 
such an attitude on behalf of the US. In fact, the stress on international terrorism 
contributed to lower China’s position on the hegemon’s threat list, and provided 
an excellent opportunity for improved relations and more ground for cooperation 
(Xinbo, 2004).52 
Ikenberry (2001: 29) points out that institutions shape the political order into 
allocating rights and restraining the exercise of power. Throughout the latest Bush 
administration and its ‘war on terror’, the US was criticised for having disregarded 
international law in general (and particularly the refusal to become a member of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC)) and adopting the controversial doctrines 
                                               
51 This tradition has heavily influenced the US administrations of the past two decades. The interventions 
in Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1995), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003) and, most recently, Libya (2011) are 
examples of its foreign policy culture. 
52 America’s eagerness to seal partnerships in the context of the ‘war on terror’ was most notably exploited 
by Russia to launch violent offensives on its Chechen rebels, but China too was quick to capitalise on the 
new circumstances by initiating its own war against the separatist Muslim minority in the Xinjiang region: 
the Chinese government reframed the conflict in international terms and Al-Qaeda became a convenient 
justification for arbitrary repression (Chung, 2002). 
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of preventive war and ‘coalitions of the willing’ – exclusive privileges which could 
not be employed by other states. In the United Nations, the embodiment of the 
international community, we can also find evidence which could suggest a US anti-
status quo orientation or, at least, its opposition to what is frequently seen as 
consensual. This can be observed both in the Security Council (as a permanent 
member, it has blocked majorities as many times as all the other four states put 
together from 1976 to 2006) and in the ratification of international agreements (it 
persuades other states to join those instruments only to reject being bound by 
them in a later stage), being the major power which has joined less treaties, with 
special incidence in the most important international human rights agreements.  
This posture, far from being conservative, showed according to Jervis that in 
a hegemonic system the rules of the game applied to all states except the hegemon 
itself (2006: 14). In the same tone, Chan concludes that, looking at the raw data 
that he uses as indicators of satisfaction, America has not shown great commitment 
to the rules of the game, operating barely inside the boundaries of the international 
community (2008: 36). This general feeling spread to public opinion. At the wake 
of the 2003 Iraq war, a particularly sensitive period for US popularity, opinion 
polls conducted throughout the European Union showed that even the citizens 
of its main partner viewed it as big as a threat to world security as Iraq, Iran and 
North Korea, the members of the so-called ‘axis of evil’ (ibid, 37-38). 
Yet, US unilateralism was not part of a plan to subvert the international order, 
but a firm response to an exceptional event (its mainland had not been attacked 
since the War of 1812 by the British). Paradoxically, underlying its assertiveness 
was the defence of the basic values of the international society. Most importantly, 
much of the American aggressiveness of the past decade can be credited to the 
“schizophrenic” (Archibugi, 2004) pursuit of security in the context of the ‘war on 
terror’, and its inability to transpose the democratic principles in use domestically 
to its foreign affairs. Concerning the American refusal of ICC membership – which 
attracted so much criticism – one must not overlook the extensive scope of US 
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involvement abroad53 and the exposure of its troops to what could be politically 
motivated prosecutions.54 In the United Nations, where the high incidence of US 
vetoes in the Security Council (as many as the sum of the other four permanent 
members) could also indicate growing dissatisfaction, it is important to note that 
this trend can be observed since the 1970s, a period in which no analyst would 
consider the US an anti-status quo power. At the same time, its reluctance to join 
the ICC, and also other important human rights-related treaties, is not related to 
reservations on their substance. Simmons (2009) describes the US as a ‘false 
negative’: the costs of commitment to the corresponding instruments are too high 
(in terms of legal-political processes among the different branches and levels of 
government) and so it opts for decoupling, nonetheless enjoying a respectable 
human rights record. Therefore, interpreting America’s attitude towards those 
treaties based solely on its (low) ratification rate is not very informative – just 
as a large number of states, the ‘false positives’, violate systematically the norms 
of human rights-related treaties which they chose to join. 
In the run-up for the 2008 presidential elections, democratic candidate Barack 
Obama promised a rupture with the preceding administration’s praxis and the 
inauguration of a new era of multilateral engagement, after a long period marked 
by the influence of republican hawks in the White House. In terms of military 
involvement abroad, the assistance provided to Libya’s rebel forces to topple an 
undemocratic regime can be interpreted as a sign of continuity. In other fields, 
although it may be too early to evaluate the magnitude of change, Homolar (2012) 
analyses the current president’s performance in terms of four transnational issue-
areas which require effective collective action (nuclear proliferation, climate 
change, humanitarian emergencies and economic crises) and claims that Obama’s 
record for his multilateral leadership is, at best, mixed. In the end, she suggests 
                                               
53 In 2004, the US had 405,000 troops deployed abroad, more than four times as much as Britain, France, 
Germany, Russia, Japan and China (with no troops abroad) put together (Chan 2008: 23). 
54 Obama, despite not being intuitively against the Court as the Bush administration was, is still not likely 
to make the US join it (Fairlie 2011: 548). 
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that the difference between Bush and Obama’s bearing on these security-related 
issues can be resumed to “a matter of emphasis (and style)” rather than the actual 
implementation of core substantive changes (ibid, 122). 
The alternative PTT’s proposition of an aggressive declining power is indeed 
compelling, but the argument of a revisionist US misses the point. Although some 
of the latest actions of the hegemon are reprehensible regarding compliance with 
international law, there was never an effort to subvert the existing order. Besides, 
whichever breaches to the rules of the game one can accuse the US of perpetrating, 
they are not directly connected to the great power game in general or the relations 
with China in particular. Quite the contrary – China’s cool acceptance of US plans 
for a long-range ballistic missile defence shield in Europe, which coincided with 
the ‘war on terror’, epitomises the lack of the sort of tension expected by PTT in 
face of an initiative whose success would provide an extraordinary competitive 
advantage to the hegemon and its allies in the military arena.55 Most importantly, 
the US-China relationship, despite the significant policy differences between each 
side, is one of deep interdependence. The current administration understands the 
importance of preserving solid ties with China, recognising that “cooperative 
relationship based on mutual interest and mutual respect is not only in the 
interests of the United States and China, but is also in the interest of the region and 
in the interest of the United States – in the interest of the world” (Obama, 2012). 
Therefore, rather than resisting it, the US “welcome[s] its peaceful rise” (ibid). 
6.2 Taiwan: a powder keg under control 
In the section dedicated to the fragile balance of the US-Taiwan-China triangle, 
Chan’s analysis points to a satisfied China based on the hypothesis that the rising 
power will logically try to perpetuate that trend. At the same time, the US’ resolve 
                                               
55 It is bewildering that only Russia protested against the American plans under the basis that they were 
directed beyond what had been announced (preventing attacks carried out by rogue states or non-state, 
terrorist organisations). China’s apparent passiveness, given its position in the international hierarchy, is 
hard to justify. 
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in defending its ally in a scenario of a Chinese aggression following a declaration 
of de jure independence cannot be compared to China’s commitment to fight for 
what it justifiably claims to be a vital interest, which in turn restrains Taiwan’s 
impulse to take risky steps.56 Time is effectively running in favour of mainland 
China, as not only the cross-strait economic relations are deepening, but also low-
politics activity, such as the exponential growth of tourism (in both directions), 
which has an important role in reducing animosity among each sides’ populations 
(Chen, 2010). Taiwan’s current President Ma Ying-jeou, unlike his predecessor, 
has clung to a non-confrontational, moderate position of accepting the status of 
the island; on the same tone, Chinese President Hu Jintao shifted from Jiang 
Zemin’s ambitious unification rhetoric into postponing unification indefinitely 
(Saunders and Kastner 2009: 88-89). This suggests that the Chinese regime is 
confident that its power of attraction over Taiwan will grow, and that if (or when) 
a future Sino-American clash over cross-strait issues occurs, it will benefit from a 
more advantageous power position than the present one. 
In what is considered East Asia’s hottest flashpoint, the latest moves of the 
challenger seem not to conform to PTT’s logic of a challenger whose rise is 
aggressive. Rather, although both sides have expressed publicly their desire for a 
peace agreement (ibid, 90), it seems more likely that a hypothetical confrontation 
would originate from a misguided action from the government of Taiwan, whose 
democratic character could, in principle, be more prone to errant impulses (e.g. 
following popular support for immediate independence – which at this moment is 
a distant scenario), as opposed to the more predictable, non-democratic Chinese 
bureaucracy. If we consider Taiwan’s undefined status as the status quo itself, it is 
the declining hegemon which is closer to getting involved, even if unwillingly, in a 
situation where it would be considered the ‘attacker’, as would be the case if it 
came to Taiwan’s rescue following a unilateral de jure independence declaration; 
                                               
56 Given the US’ wider strategic interest of exerting influence on both sides while preventing one or the 
other to precipitate a crisis, the author prefers the term pivotal, rather than extended, deterrence to 
explain the ambivalent relation with China and Taiwan. 
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conversely, China’s military intervention, aimed at restoring the status quo ante, 
would make it the conservative side. All in all, none of the three feel the benefit of 
a confrontation, hence the tightly controlled powder keg. In the case of the US, a 
China-Taiwan showdown would only bring harm, as it would have to choose one 
of two “bads”: either abandon Taiwan and lose face, or embark in a conflict of  
unimaginable consequences to honour its commitments. If the second option was 
taken, that action would be seen as a mere excuse for a preventive war against a 
rising China (Layne 2008: 17), very different in character from other interventions 
in the past two decades. 
By way of conclusion, because the evidence points to a stable stalemate, with 
all three parties fairly satisfied, I maintain that in the case of Taiwan there is no 
reason to suspect that a dissatisfied US is hoping for the right moment to use this 
latent conflict in order to stop its rival’s ascent to superpowerdom. In relation to 
the first question – the hypothetical American desire to change the rules of the 
game as it senses China closing the power gap – I come to a similar conclusion: 
the US has not attempted to subvert the order it itself created – even if, in the heat 
that followed unprecedented events in its history, the opposite impression may 
have come across.  
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7. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this investigation was to understand why and how power transition 
theory and liberal-institutionalist theory differ on the effects of a forthcoming US-
China power transition in terms of hegemonic war. This required contrasting the 
two opposing camps, namely in their understanding of power and the expectations 
on the evolvement and effects of transitions. 
The analysis on power exposed the clear-cut theoretical divergences among 
the two theories, which in turn led to disparate evaluations on the size of the 
power gap between the hegemon and the challenger, the speed at which it is being 
closed down, and a rough estimate of where the crossover point is situated. The 
power indexes selected to represent each side magnified the theories’ deviation, 
the CINC avowing that the US-China crossover has already occurred, and the SNPI 
suggesting that it is far from happening, or might never occur. The discrepancies 
in the reading of ‘reality’ constituted an analytical problem which forced me to 
rely on observers’ common interpretation of the existence of a closing power gap 
(at a slower or faster rate) from which my empirical test for Chinese revisionism 
was based on. Juxtaposing the CINC (closely related with Organski and Kugler’s 
power construct) with the SNPI (linked to the institutionalist ‘power as networks’ 
dimension) for a head-to-head comparison of the hegemon and the challenger 
ended up revealing the limitations of those models’ applicability. 
Regarding the likelihood of transitional periods resulting in violent conflict, 
although definite yes-no answers are not provided, power transition theory shares 
an overall pessimism on the outcome of those events. On the other hand, liberal-
institutional theory considers that crossover periods can be peaceful, and even 
likely, in the particular US-China case given the ability of the present order to 
accommodate the rise of challengers to dominance. The theoretical contributions 
on transitions proved more useful than those on measuring power. Even though 
it is falsifiable only some point in the future (when the overtaking actually occurs), 
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the power transition theory’s hypothesis of the challenger’s rising aggressiveness 
as it becomes stronger can be tested from the early stage of China’s ascending 
growth trajectory (roughly the beginning of the 1990s). Notwithstanding the 
distance from the critical crossover point, that hypothesis was not observed; in 
fact, the opposite is true in a first period (assertiveness to accommodation), 
followed by some indicators suggesting that the challenger’s attitude may be 
reaching a turning point (accommodation to assertiveness) in the past few years. 
For that reason, China’s conscientious strategic choices in its interactions with 
the US show that the exponential dissatisfaction of the challenger should not be 
presupposed. In the case under study, the argument of a unique post-1945 order 
becomes more convincing than the generalisations offered by power transition 
theory. 
Finally, although a number of indicators from both theoretical frameworks 
point at the general trend of China’s growth relative to the US, uncertainty on the 
actual crossover period means that conclusions should be guided by prudence. 
For instance, if the overtaking takes place in 2050, because China’s dissatisfaction 
with the status quo is only expected to surface and build up some years prior, it is 
too early to be tested; if, however, the crossover happens in the near future (for 
instance, by the end of this decade, as some analysts predict), my claim that Sino-
American relations in the verge of a power shift are best captured by liberal-
institutional theory is more robust in face of the empirical findings. 
In sum, even after taking into account the important caveats mentioned above, 
liberal-institutionalist theory provides a more accurate picture of the evolution of 
US-China relations. In a record that is mixed and non-linear, China nevertheless 
shows stronger signs of successful accommodation to the rules of the game. On 
the other hand, the alternative proposition of a declining hegemon’s revisionist 
inclinations in the context of great power contest is not corroborated by American 
actions.  
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Annexes 
 
Annex I: Dyadic distribution of power and the incidence of war57 
 
Central major powers: Contenders 
 
Unequal 
 
Equal, No 
Overtaking 
 
Equal and 
Overtaking 
 
 
 
War: 
No 4 (100%) 6 (100%) 5 (50%) 
 Yes 0 – 0 – 5 (50%) 
 
 
Annex II Population (in millions)58 
 
 
Annex III GDP growth (annual %) 
 
 
                                               
57 Organski and Kugler (1980: 52). 
58 The data used in Annexes II to V, VII, IX, and XI to XVII was collected from World Bank (2011). 
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Annex IV Projections based on 1990-2010 average GDP growth rate (current 
US$, in trillions)59 
 
 
Annex V Projections based on 1990-2010 average GDP growth rate (constant 
2000 US$, in trillions) 
 
 
Annex VI Military expenditure (constant 2009 US$, in billions)60 
 
                                               
59 In Annex IV and V, the heavier shaded areas represent the period between the points where China 
reaches 80% of the US’ GDP (left margin) and the “crossover” occurs (right margin). 
60 SIPRI (2010). 
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Annex VII Military expenditure (% of GDP) 
 
 
Annex VIII Composite Index of National Capabilities (% of global aggregate)61 
 
 
Annex IX International tourism (millions of arrivals) 
 
 
                                               
61 COW (2007). 
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Annex X International student mobility (destination country) (in thousands)62 
 
 
Annex XI Internet users (% of population) 
 
 
Annex XII Cellular phone subscriptions (% of population) 
 
                                               
62 Verbik and Lasanowski (2007). From 1997 to 2006, despite the four-fold increase of its figures, China 
only jumped from 8th (assuming that France’s score was not much lower in 1997 – no data available – 
from what it scored in the subsequent years) to 6th place in the ranking. 
0 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
US 
China 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
US 
China 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
US 
China 
80 
 
Annex XIII Scientific and technical journal articles (in thousands) 
 
 
Annex XIV Patent applications (in thousands) 
 
 
Annex XV Life expectancy at birth (in years) 
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Annex XVI Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 
 
 
Annex  XVII GDP per capita, PPP (current US$, in thousands) 
 
 
Annex XVIII Ranking of countries on SNPI measures: ‘Degree’63 
Pos. 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
1 US (0.595) US (0.551) US (0.600) US (0.592) US (0.580) 
2 UK (0.437) UK (0.488) France (0.528) France (0.540)  France (0.513) 
3 France (0.399) France (0.469) UK (0.509) UK (0.487) UK (0.489) 
4 Italy (0.271) Italy (0.345) Italy (0.375) Italy (0.400) Canada (0.406) 
5 FRG (0.269) Canada (0.272) Belgium (0.316) Canada (0.390) Italy (0.391) 
...           
 (China always below 15th pos.) 
  
 
 
                                               
63 Annexes XVIII to XXII are adapted from Kim (2009). 
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Annex  XIX Ranking of countries on SNPI measures: ‘Betweeness’ 
Pos. 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
1 US (0.100) US (0.097) US (0.101) US (0.100) US (0.106) 
2 France (0.075) France (0.066) France (0.051) France (0.048) France (0.038) 
3 UK (0.048) UK (0.060) UK (0.046) UK (0.035) UK (0.034) 
4 FRG (0.034) FRG (0.024) Italy (0.024) Italy (0.023) Germany (0.033) 
5 USSR (0.020) Italy (0.021) Japan (0.019) Germany (0.018) Italy (0.033) 
...           
8    
(below 15th pos.) 
China (0.012) 
9 China (0.009)   
 
Annex  XX Ranking of countries on SNPI measures: ‘Flow-Betweeness’ 
Pos. 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
1 US (0.075) US (0.069) US (0.068) US (0.071) US (0.062) 
2 France (0.059) France (0.052) France (0.040) France (0.042) France (0.034) 
3 UK (0.035) UK (0.048) UK (0.040) UK (0.031) UK (0.024) 
4 FRG (0.025) USSR (0.026) Italy (0.019) Italy (0.018) Italy (0.023) 
5 USSR (0.021) FRG (0.019) Japan (0.017) Germany (0.016) Russia (0.022) 
...           
8 China (0.011)    
(below 
15th pos.) 
 
(below 
15th pos.) 
  
9     China (0.013) 
...       
14   China (0.007)   
 
Annex XXI Ranking of countries on SNPI measures: ‘Coreness’ 
Pos. 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
1 US (0.493) US (0.257) US (0.407) US (0.378) US (0.347) 
2 UK (0.227) UK (0.254) France (0.220) Italy (0.226) UK (0.253) 
3 France (0.197) France (0.224) UK (0.210) France (0.225) Canada (0.229) 
4 Italy (0.171) USSR (0.215) Italy (0.175) UK (0.224) France (0.211) 
5 Belgium (0.166) FRG (0.202) FRG (0.164) Netherl. (0.201) Switz. (0.208) 
...           
 (China always below 15th pos.) 
 
Annex  XXII Ranking of countries on SNPI measures: ‘Egonet brokerage’ 
Pos. 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
1 US (0.876) US (0.876) US (0.877) US (0.872) US (0.870) 
2 UK (0.858) UK (0.874) UK (0.857) France (0.847) France (0.838) 
3 France (0.844) France (0.857) France (0.849) UK (0.832) UK (0.818) 
4 Italy (0.785) Italy (0.821) Italy (0.809) Canada (0.782) Italy (0.798) 
5 FRG (0.719) Canada (0.749) Japan (0.752) Italy (0.770) Canada (0.778) 
...           
 (China always below 15th pos.) 
 
